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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
 
1. This paper presents new quarterly panel data models for county court claims and orders 
for mortgage possession for seven regions of England plus Wales. Different types of data 
on mortgage possessions are compared.  
2. The innovations include the treatment of difficult to observe variations in loan quality and 
shifts in forbearance policy by lenders, by common indicators based on dummy variables. 
3. The main drivers of mortgage possessions rates are three economic variables, as well as 
forbearance policy and credit factors, including previous credit quality, access to 
refinancing opportunities and income support policy. The three drivers are the debt 
service ratio, the proportion of mortgages in negative equity (based on an average debt to 
equity ratio in each region) and the unemployment rate. The specification imposes 
common long-run coefficients on the impact of these three variables, but allows rich 
heterogeneity in the dynamics. 
4. These regional findings corroborate those in Aron and Muellbauer's (2010) analysis of 
aggregate UK possessions and arrears data.   
5. As in 1990s mortgage crisis, the recent upturn in the possessions rate was preceded by 
lower lending quality and rising debt and house price levels, and accompanied by 
growing negative equity and unemployment.  However, there is a stark difference. The 
1990s crisis was triggered by a large rise in interest rates, and policy constraints prevented 
the reduction of rates. The recent rise in the possessions rate preceded the most dramatic 
interest rate reductions in British economic history.   
6. The lower interest rates and other policy interventions caused the UK possessions rate to 
peak at the end of 2008 at around half the peak experienced in the 1990s crisis.   
7. Regional data on court orders for mortgage possession show that the Southern part of 
England was hit far harder in the 1990s than recently.  Thus, Wales and the Northern half 
of England experienced lower court orders for possessions rates than the Southern half in 
the 1990s.  At the recent 2008 peak, however, court orders rates matched the North’s peak 
in the 1990s and not far below the peaks in Yorkshire and Humberside, Wales and the 
West Midlands. 
8. This is largely explained by lower levels of debt relative to income in the Northern half of 
the country, by the later and smaller fall in Northern house prices in the 1990s in contrast 
to the larger and longer fall in 2008-9, while, in the 1990s, unemployment shocks were 
more adverse in southerly regions and in 2008-10 in northerly regions.  
9. There is also evidence of further heterogeneity across regions possibly related to 
differences in the incidence of ‘buy-to-let’ lending. 
10. A range of economic forecast scenarios for forecasts to 2015 reveals the sensitivity of 
mortgage possessions orders to different economic conditions, highlighting potential risks 
faced by UK mortgage lenders. 
11. Simulations suggest that softer house prices in 2011 combined with some withdrawal of 
income support would be likely to lead to a small upturn in possessions orders in most 
regions.  However, the most serious potential cause of rising possession rates would be 
some return of mortgage interest rates to more ‘normal levels’.  Much then hinges on 
when this is likely to occur. 
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I. Introduction 
 
After the house price and credit boom of the 1980s, the years 1990-95 saw a record number of 
households, around 345,000, and containing perhaps one million individuals,
 
suffering the 
misfortune of mortgage possession.  The house price and credit boom, ending in mid-2007, 
once again increased the proportion of households with overstretched budgets and over-
extended debts relative to their assets. At its peak in 2008, however, the UK possessions rate 
reached only half that of the 1990s possessions peak. A deeper possessions crisis was avoided 
mainly through dramatic monetary policy interventions, bringing base rates rapidly down to 
half a percent, and to some extent the quantitative easing that lowered spreads between base 
rate and mortgage rates. Forbearance policy and increased income support for those with 
payment difficulties also assisted. 
 The possessions outlook was particularly uncertain in 2008-9, and reflected in 
successive downward revisions of forecasts of possessions cases in 2009 by the Council of 
Mortgage Lenders (CML) between November 2008 and the final publication of the 2009 data. 
In August 2010, CML again revised down its June forecasts for possessions for the whole of 
2010 to 39,000 from an original estimate of 53,000.  The lack of clarity about the scale of the 
UK’s mortgage following the global financial crisis, was due to the uncertain impacts of a 
tighter credit market in the UK, with lower interest rates, lower house prices, unemployment 
and income, and the uncertain effects of changing lending quality and policy interventions. 
 Fluctuations in aggregate UK possessions rates are shown in Figure 1. Recent 
policy changes increasing lender forbearance have reduced the possessions rate, though the 
rate of mortgages in arrears rose. Figure 1 also illustrates that voluntary possessions were at 
low levels until around 2007 and then rose sharply, while the possessions rate on buy-to-let 
was higher in 2009-10 than the rate for all loans.  
An analysis of the CML’s national data on possessions and arrears by Aron and 
Muellbauer (2010) has thrown light on the complex mix of factors driving defaults and 
payment difficulties. Under most scenarios considered, they found the decline in the 
possessions rate in 2009 and 2010 from its peak at the end of 2008 should prove temporary.  
In particular, the return of mortgage interest rates to more normal levels is likely to renew the 
upward drift in the possessions rate. Much then depends on when this occurs. 
This paper complements the national analysis in Aron and Muellbauer (2010) by 
analysing the regional historical variations in court possession actions and orders, using data 
from the County Courts for England and Wales. The court data are the only currently 
available data offering clues about regional divergences in possessions rates. The court data 
differ in several respects from the CML’s possessions data (see Section 2), though the trends 
share common factors. Court possessions claims (actions) and orders data for England and 
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Wales in aggregate from the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) are shown in Figure 2, as a fraction of 
the number of UK mortgages outstanding. The pattern is similar to the CML’s possessions 
rate. The claims (actions) rate leads the orders rate, the orders rate is lower on average than 
the claims rate, and there is widening of the gap between the two in 2003-08. The fall in the 
ratio of suspended court orders to total court orders between 2003 and 2007 may be connected 
with the then increasing share of securitized and ‘sub-prime’1 mortgages in the UK.  The 
lenders originating these loans may have practiced tougher policies or, having made more 
risky lending decisions, may have anticipated problems and reacted to them more quickly. 
The paper employs panel models which can distinguish the region-specific labour and 
housing market shocks (e.g. rises in unemployment and falls in house prices and real 
incomes) from national trends in lending quality and policy interventions on mortgage 
possessions. Despite the different data sources and definitions, the regional analysis of the 
court claims and orders data offers a potential check on the aggregate findings of Aron and 
Muellbauer (2010), including the role they give lending quality and policy shifts. 
The most systematic previous study of the court data is by Cameron and Muellbauer 
(1997), examining annual panel data from 1987 to 1996. For the court claims (actions) rate, 
the key long-run economic drivers were the debt service ratio and the debt to equity ratio. 
There were short-run effects from the change in the claimant count unemployment rate, the 
rates of change of nominal house prices and the previous year’s rate of business deregistration 
from VAT.  Important time effects, common to all regions, were interpreted as shifts in 
lending quality and forbearance policy. The court orders rate was modeled, explained by the 
court claims (actions) rate, the above economic variables and time effects. In the long run, the 
ratio of orders to claims depended only on the debt to equity ratio and common time effects, 
though the short-run dynamics also depended on the change in the unemployment rate and in 
house prices.  Cooper and Meen (2001) have also modelled the annual regional data on court 
orders to 1999, but without regional debt to equity ratios, and using only limited dummies for 
shifts in behaviour common to regions. However, they also found a large influence of debt 
service ratios on court orders. 
The key innovations of this paper are firstly, the use of quarterly data from 1987 to 
2010Q3 that more than doubles the annual number of observations, and includes a second 
economic cycle that is very different from the 1987 to 1995 cycle. This should make the 
identification of common shifts in lending quality and forbearance policy more robust. The 
quarterly frequency permits a more careful examination of the dynamics in the relationships, 
                                                 
1  “Sub-prime” is a US term and there is no comparable definition of “sub-prime” in the UK. The FSA 
only report on mortgages which are “credit-impaired” which is not comparable to the US FICO-based 
definition of “sub-prime”. Such firms do a range of business, not only credit-impaired business. 
Features of US “sub-prime” lending, such as lack of income verification, were also practiced by 
“mainstream” UK lenders. A better tern would thus be: “non bank/ building society lenders”. 
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and increases the information content. Secondly, our regional estimates of the proportion of 
mortgages in negative equity are used instead of regional estimates of debt to equity ratios: 
based on theory (see section 3), negative equity should be more closely associated with 
possessions. Thirdly, regional data on the Labour Force Survey measure of the unemployment 
rate replace the claimant count rate used by Cameron and Muellbauer (1997).  Together with 
the increase in the number of observations and data frequency, this makes it possible to 
distinguish unemployment level effects from the effects of changes in the unemployment rate.  
The outline of the paper is as follows. The definitions and characteristics of the court 
data are discussed in Section 2.  The theoretical framework and an empirical specification 
deriving from this approach are outlined in Section 3. In Section 4, the empirical results are 
presented, first analysing the aggregate data for England and Wales, and then the regional 
panel data.  The complex data construction entailed is detailed in a data appendix. The paper 
concludes with regional prospects for the rates of court orders for mortgage possession, by 
simulating the above model under several scenarios to 2015. 
 
2. A Perspective on County Court Possessions Data 
 
2.1   The County Court Data and CML’s Possessions Data 
 
In most cases, mortgage possession involves court proceedings. Ford et al. (1995) report that 
even in cases where households voluntarily handed the keys of their property to their 
mortgage lender, evidence of court proceedings was often a requirement to be eligible for 
rehousing in the social rented sector. Thus, data on court proceedings are of general interest 
for understanding the phenomenon of mortgage possession.  
Quarterly data on County Court claims (actions) and orders for mortgage possession 
have been published by the MoJ since 1987 (Table 1). The Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) and CML report only aggregate UK data.  The characteristics of these data from the 
three providers are contrasted in Ministry of Justice (2009). The MoJ data are the only source 
of regularly available regional data to map possessions and cover all court possession actions 
in England and Wales, regardless of the nature of the loan (i.e. whether it is first charge or 
second charge lending, or other types of credit including commercial loans).2 Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, accounting for perhaps ten percent of mortgages outstanding, are excluded 
from the MoJ figures. The data cover both mortgage actions, and social and private landlord 
                                                 
2
 This means that separate claims and orders may be issued concerning the same property. Note that 
prior to the recent redefinition by the MoJ (see Table 1), there could be instances of multiple orders on 
the same claim.  
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actions.3 Scotland and Northern Ireland, accounting for perhaps 10 percent of mortgages 
outstanding, are excluded from the MoJ figures. Buy-to-let loans are included. The CML data 
also include buy-to-let loans, but they cover only first charge loans and only for those 
financial firms that are members of the CML (from 2006, the CML expanded their coverage  
the “non-bank, building society” lenders). The FSA data from 2007 cover first charge and 
second charge lending, but only for FSA-regulated financial firms, and include buy-to-let 
loans. The FSA data are somewhat higher than CML figures since 2007, but the CML figures 
are the only source for historical comparisons. All three providers report court-ordered 
possessions, but unlike the CML and the FSA, the MoJ excludes voluntary possessions such 
as abandonments and cases where the lender has obtained possession without recourse to the 
courts. Finally, riskier mortgages which are part of the MoJ count may be under-represented 
in the CML data since some lenders of ‘sub-prime’ mortgages were not CML members, 
though CML have scaled their figures to attempt to be representative of all first charge 
mortgages.  
Two types of data are reported by the MoJ: the “claims issued” by the county courts 
(initiating the county court process to obtain a possession order) and the “orders made” by the 
judges in the courts. The orders made include both the “outright orders” that entitle the 
claimant to apply for a warrant to evict the debtor, and “suspended orders” where the claimant 
is granted possession, but the operation of the order is suspended and cannot be enforced if 
the debtor complies with the terms of suspension, which usually require the defendant to pay 
the current mortgage instalments plus some of the accrued arrears. Not all possession claims 
lead to orders made while debtors may be able to avoid repossession even after a possession 
order is awarded against them. Many claims are a warning shot to the borrower to begin 
discussions with the lender. This is also true for court orders, and even for outright orders. 
There are time lags entailed in the court procedures, so that court claims issued and orders 
made may occur in earlier periods than the actual possessions, should these occur. The MoJ 
figures are thus an over-estimate of the actual number of homes possessed via a court 
procedure (Ministry of Justice, 2009).  A recent view from the FSA is that the main reason for 
the gap between CML and FSA- possession statistics is due to the different treatment of buy-
                                                 
3
 The figures used in the econometric exercises in this study, however, are for orders issued for 
mortgaged properties only (this includes all types of mortgage lenders), and they do not include any 
figures regarding private or social landlord possession cases. Bridging finance companies, included in 
the orders data, are also excluded in our study, as typically this is unsecured lending. The 2009 edition 
of Judicial and Court Statistics (published in September, 2010 by the MoJ) gives the number of 
repossessions of property by bailiffs with a breakdown by the type of claim (mortgage, private landlord 
and so forth). Quarterly breakdowns are available by regions from 2000, on request from the MoJ.  
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to-let Receiver-of-Rent cases.4 The FSA’s data also differ from the CML’s data through 
coverage only of loans made by regulated firms and coverage of second charge loans, but the 
CML data also exclude buy-to-let mortgages for which a receiver of rent (RoR) has been 
appointed5, whereas the FSA includes these cases. Where there are both first and subsequent 
charges on a property (often where the subsequent charges are held with other lenders), some 
possessions may be reported more than once by the FSA.  
 There are thus some major differences between data sources on possessions. Figure 
3 shows ratios of the numbers of MOJ court claims, court orders and of outright court orders 
to the CML’s count of possessions. At an extreme point in 2004, there were about nine times 
as many MoJ court claims as CML possessions cases, about five times as many court orders 
and around twice as many outright orders. This is despite the exclusion of Northern Ireland 
and Scotland, and of voluntary possessions cases included in the CML figures.6 The scale of 
the differences between numbers of court actions and numbers of possessions emphasises that 
most actions for possession do not result in possession.  
  Ongoing research by the FSA suggests that lagged possession orders track CML 
possession statistics adjusted for voluntary possessions relatively closely up to around 
2001/2, before possession orders increase as possessions continue to fall. There was a period 
of rapid appreciation of house prices after 2001. Many borrowers in difficulties sold (the 
growth in sale and rent back which was marketed as an alternative to possession was 
probably an important influence). During 2002-2007, those in payment default, but with 
equity, could trade out of the position or borrow more to forestall possession. Distressed 
borrowers easily obtained re-mortgages (often with a new lender) and second charge credit 
without the requirement of income verification.  This enabled the avoidance of possession for 
extended periods, even when a possession order had been granted. Lenders reacted by 
moving to court proceedings given expectations of losses from the deteriorating borrower 
quality. The at-risk borrowers migrated down the spectrum towards lenders with shallower 
capital cushions to allow sustained forbearance (and quickening the time taken to obtain a 
                                                 
4 These cases can arise for buy-to-let mortgages, where the court order specifies the appointment of a 
receiver, so that the lender receives rent payments via the receiver rather than directly from the 
landlord.  
5 We are grateful to John Longbottom of the FSA for drawing our attention to these details. Analysis by 
the FSA of the possessions data produced since 2007 as part of their regulatory requirements supports 
this view. Moreover, analysis by the FSA suggests that the majority of possessions that occur in the 
unregulated market arises from buy-to-let loans (including RoR cases) rather than second charge loans. 
This view is supported by separate data on second charge possessions produced by the Finance and 
Leasing Association. 
6
 Indeed, in 1995, around one third of the CML’s possessions cases were classified as voluntary, 
though between 2003 and 2007, the proportion was under 15 percent. The factors influencing the 
decision to voluntarily give up a property have been explored qualitatively using micro-data by Ford 
(2009) and Ford et al. (2010). 
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possession order once in arrears).7 The FSA has examined around 2,000 credit histories from 
house purchase through to possession. Frequently, the borrower had a history of re-
mortgaging and obtaining additional credit, until about 6 – 9 months prior to possession.  
This pattern of behavior mirrors that identified by LaCour-Little et al. (2009) in California. 
The MoJ data cover all loans while the CML data up to 2006 may have slightly under-
adjusted for loans made by non-bank, non-building society lenders. 
The above considerations help explain the widening gap between orders and 
possessions after 2001. The subsequent lack of refinancing opportunities, given the tightening 
of lending conditions and the decline in resale options, together with “Mortgages and Home 
Finance: Conduct of Business sourcebook” (MCOB) guidance, may have tended to bring 
possessions and orders more back into line.   
Indeed, the time profile of the ratio of court orders to the CML’s possessions data is 
distinctive. The ratio is high in ‘good times’ and falls in ‘bad times’. To put it another way, in 
‘good times’ court orders fall but possessions fall by even more; the reverse tends to be true in 
‘bad times’. In Figure 4 it is plotted against our estimate of the proportion of UK mortgages in 
negative equity, the UK debt service ratio and the unemployment rate, all in logs.  When 
unemployment, negative equity and the debt service ratio are low, the count of the CML’s 
possessions is low relative to the court orders made.  To put it simply: since possession is an 
extreme outcome which is harder to avoid when fundamentals are bad, one should expect a 
lower rate of claims and orders to possession at such times. However, this also depends on the 
lenders’ expectations of future prices, for the lender may wish to sell even at a loss if further 
falls in prices are anticipated.  It also depends on the degree of recourse available to the 
lenders: often they cannot claim on indemnities until a loss is booked, nor claim against any 
professionals’ insurances to sue for malpractice. Moreover, covenants attached to 
securitisation funding may lead to penalties for lenders in breach of these terms (e.g. a 
common covenant relates to the proportion of loans in arrears at a given point in time).  
 
2.2    Changing policy on possessions and changes in lending quality 
 
Policy shifts  
 
Governments can influence possessions rates in several different ways. They can try to alter 
the forbearance policies of mortgage lenders and court procedures. They can alter the income 
                                                 
7 We are grateful to John Longbottom of the FSA for this point. Work in the US by Mian and Sufi 
(2010) suggests an initially strong negative relationship between house price growth and defaults as 
borrowers can forestall defaults by borrowing more. “Lower credit quality households living in high 
house price appreciation areas experience a relative decline in default rates from 2002 to 2006 as they 
borrow heavily against their home equity, but experience very high default rates from 2006 to 2008.” 
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and other support offered to mortgage borrowers in difficulty. Finally, they can influence 
economic drivers such average income, the unemployment rate, interest rates and house 
prices. Aron and Muellbauer (2010) distinguished forbearance policy from income support 
policies by the differential effect each has on possessions and mortgage arrears. Increased 
forbearance lowers possessions but increases arrears; increased income support for those with 
payment difficulties, lowers both possessions and arrears. Increased forbearance has a direct 
effect on arrears, since every mortgage already in arrears which does not move into 
possession then swells the arrears count. There may be an incentive effect: if lenders are more 
lenient on possessions, households may prove less rigorous in reducing debt.  
There are parallels in forbearance policies in 1991 and 2008. Heightened public 
concern about mortgage possessions resulted in the implicit contract agreed between the 
Government and mortgage lenders in late 1991 before the 1992 General Election, to reduce 
possessions. The government paid income support for mortgage interest direct to the lenders, 
stimulated the housing market by raising the Stamp Duty ceiling for a year and gave ear-
marked grants to housing associations to purchase properties. In return, lenders agreed to 
greater leniency on possessions. Practices by the County Courts also altered in the 1990s, with 
longer repayment periods for households in payment arrears being permitted, see Ford (1994) 
and Ford et al. (1995, ch. 5). The government substantially reduced the generosity of Support 
for Mortgage Interest (SMI) from 1995, see Dale (1995) and Stephens (1996). In 2008 the 
government of the time exerted pressure toward leniency on lenders (some of whom the 
government newly-owned in part). The SMI became more generous, a Mortgage Pre-action 
Protocol was introduced from November 2008, and a Mortgage Rescue Scheme and 
Homeowners’ Mortgage Support (Stephens (2009) summarises these measures). An important 
ingredient was setting the standard mortgage rate at which SMI was paid at 6.08 percent until 
October 2010, far above the average rate on outstanding mortgages of around 3.6 percent. 
Indirect policy support included another Stamp Duty holiday, and mortgage loan targets for 
wholly or partly-owned banks (Northern Rock, and Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds TSB). 
The Courts are unlikely, as in the early 1990s, to have been entirely immune from 
these recent shifts in public and official concern, though the discretion that can be exercised 
by the courts is limited by the 1970 (amended 1973) Administration of Justice Act. It is 
possible that the apparent softening of forbearance policies by the courts from 2008 may also 
have been influenced by the loss of public reputation by the banks in the financial crisis, 
though perhaps more important was a change in lender behaviour, when some lenders, such as 
Northern Rock, came into outright or partial public ownership. 
To understand the variations that have occurred in rates of mortgage possession, such 
shifts in behaviour should be taken into account along with the influence of variations in 
economic conditions, such as the debt to equity ratio or the proportion in negative equity, and 
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debt service ratios, unemployment shocks, and house price developments. Indeed, 
econometric studies of aggregate mortgage possession data such as Breedon and Joyce 
(1992), Brookes et al. (1994), and Allen and Milne (1994), estimated on data up to 1990 or 
1991, break down badly on later data. 
 
 
 Changes in lending quality  
 
Lending quality has varied over time. Centralised mortgage lenders increased their market 
share in the late 1980s, often to less credit-worthy customers, and contributed to high 
possessions and arrears in the 1990s.  Ford et al. (1995) quote possessions rates for 
centralised mortgage lenders averaging three times those of high street banks. In 2005-7 the 
shares of self-certification mortgages and of mortgages issued by non-banks and building 
society subsidiaries rose sharply (Turner, 2009), and such mortgages have shown higher 
default rates.8  
Loan quality is difficult to measure directly. Since 1968, micro data have been 
collected from mortgage lenders on loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios, often used as 
indicators of lending quality or credit availability or both. However, these indicators are not 
pure measures of lending quality as they also depend on interest rates, house prices, incomes 
and other variables (see Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer, 2006). Moreover, the data are 
not comparable over time, nor do they fully capture the quality of the screening carried out by 
lenders. Aron and Muellbauer (2010) therefore used a latent variable based on dummies, 
common to a three-equation system of possessions and arrears equations, to capture changes 
in loan quality and in forbearance policy. The strategy of the empirical work below is to use 
the loan quality and forbearance policy indicators estimated in Aron and Muellbauer (2010), 
and to check their robustness in the context of the court claims and orders data (see Section 
3.2).   
  
3. The Double Trigger Model for Defaults and an Empirical Specification 
 
There is general agreement that mortgage defaults or possessions result from some mix of 
excessive debt relative to home equity and cash flow problems.  This is consistent with the 
‘double trigger’ approach, a more general view of mortgage possession than the option 
pricing approach popular in some of the US literature, see Kau et al. (1992) and Deng et al. 
(2000), and applied to UK data by Ncube and Satchell (1994). In the option pricing model, 
                                                 
8
 See the FSA’a CP10/16: Mortgage Market Review: Responsible lending (July 2010), p.20, chapter 6 
and Appendix A1 p.5-12. 
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default is chosen by the household once housing equity falls below the mortgage debt level by 
a given percentage, which depends mainly on house price uncertainty. Even in the US, where 
mortgages in many states are non-recourse loans (i.e. where the lender's rights are restricted to 
the equity in the home, excluding recourse to the borrower’s income or other assets), doubt 
has been cast on this ‘ruthless default’ literature (Vandell, 1995). Recent empirical literature 
adopts a more general approach that encompasses cash flow problems, for example, Gerrardi 
et al. (2008) and Foote et al. (2008). 
 In what follows we present the double trigger framework and derive the associated 
empirical specification for modelling and forecasting regional possessions. 
 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
The double trigger approach rests on the idea that defaults occur not just because home equity 
is low relative to debt, but also because households have cash-flow problems. An early 
exposition of the theory behind the double trigger model is by Elmer and Seelig (1998), and it 
underlies much recent micro-econometric work on US mortgage defaults (Bajari et al. (2009); 
Gerardi et al. (2008)).  These authors argue that, abstracting from variations in interest rates, 
default for a household, due to a weak net equity position, occurs when the debt to equity 
ratio exceeds a particular threshold cit, where the threshold depends positively on the expected 
growth rate of house prices, given transactions delays, and also on house price volatility 
(Bajari et al. (2009), their equation (4), p.10).9  
Bajari et al. argue that when interest rates can change, the threshold depends 
additionally on an interest rate term (their equation (10), p. 13).  Default due to a weak net 
equity position can occur even if the household does not have cash flow problems. This is 
particularly relevant in the US where, in states such as California, borrowers have a ‘walk 
away’ option so that their liability is confined to the value of the home.  
However, default can also occur because of cash flow problems induced by credit 
constraints. Bajari et al. argue that this will occur when the debt service ratio exceeds a 
threshold, but depends also on the credit worthiness of the household, its employment status 
and its expected income growth (their equation (13), p.15).  This can be expressed by a trigger 
function, a relationship between a household’s unemployment rate, its credit score and its 
expected income growth being positive.10 
                                                 
9
 Expressed technically as condition (1), ( )it it itlog mortgagedebt / equity   c>  ,  for household i at time 
t, and a threshold cit .  
10Technically, this can be expressed by condition (2), a trigger function:
e
it it it itf (debt service ratio ,  ur ,  cs ,  y )  0 ∆ > , where ur is the household’s unemployment rate, cs its credit 
score and ∆ye represents its expected income growth.  
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Bajari et al. embed the first debt-equity threshold condition in a utility model, so that 
if the utility associated with this type of default is positive, the household will default.11  The 
debt service trigger condition is treated as an aspect of the budget constraint, outside the 
control of the household.  Default then occurs if either or both conditions are fulfilled.12  
There is a problem with this formulation. It makes little sense for a household with 
positive net housing equity to default, even when there are cash flow problems.  With positive 
equity, such households may have refinancing possibilities or could sell the home rather than 
lose it through possession.  It seems more plausible that default should occur either when 
there is weak debt to equity position or when both conditions are met, that is, the debt service 
relationship is positive and the debt to equity ratio exceeds a particular threshold c0t .13   Thus, 
a weak debt to equity position is the common factor in all defaults.    
It is plausible that the factors driving defaults might be a little different for buy-to-let 
borrowers who may be more concerned about expected capital gains or losses, the stability of 
rental cash flows and with their tax position.  The composition of the mortgage stock by type 
of borrower could then affect the behaviour of aggregate mortgage defaults.14 
   In the UK, unlike the US, it is probable that relatively few possessions cases arise only 
through the debt to equity ratio exceeding c0t (condition (1)) since the consequences of 
possession are more painful. Mortgage borrowers can be pursued for up to six years for negative 
equity remaining after the lender has sold off a home in possession and the threat of such action 
is likely to deter borrowers from choosing possession as an easy option. This contrasts with non-
recourse mortgage loans and ‘walk away’ options in some states of the US, and a general 
scepticism elsewhere among US lenders regarding the benefits relative to the costs of trying to 
recover such losses. 
Given individual heterogeneity and knowledge of (or assumptions on) the 
distributions of the observable data (such as the debt to equity ratio) and of the unobservable 
data (such as tastes) at the micro level, one could obtain the aggregate proportion of defaults 
as a function of the means of the observables and of the parameters of the distributions. 
Without knowledge of the distributions of observable and unobservable data, the functional 
form of the relationship between the aggregate proportion of defaults and the means of the 
observable data is unknown, but in general will be non-linear.  Specifically, there is an 
                                                 
11
 The utility function incorporates an unobserved random variable, for example representing household 
tastes or an unobserved household characteristic, so that the probability of default can be derived from 
the probability distribution of this random variable combined with the observable elements of the 
threshold condition. 
12
 This is modelled as a bivariate probit, given some unobserved stochastic components reflecting tastes 
and household characteristics. 
13
 Technically, this is expressed as condition (3), 
( )eit it it it it it 0   f (debtservice ratio ,  ur ,  cs ,  y )  0        log mortgage debt / equity  c tand∆ > >  
14
 We are grateful to John Longbottom, FSA for this observation and also for noting that since about 
2003 an increasing proportion of conventional mortgage may be disguised buy-to-let mortgages.  
11 
 
important common element in all default outcomes involving a threshold for log (mortgage 
debt/equity). Although c0t is expected to be a little below zero (e.g. from transactions costs), 
while option pricing theory implies cit would be a little above zero, the proportions of 
households satisfying each condition should be highly correlated with the proportion in 
negative equity (the proportion for whom log (mortgage debt/equity) exceeds zero).  
On specific assumptions, it is possible to derive a simple relationship between the 
proportion of households with negative equity, and mean debt and mean equity. Suppose, for 
example, that debt and equity have log-normal distributions, so that the log (mortgage 
debt/equity) is also normally distributed. The proportion of mortgages with negative equity, i.e. 
log (mortgage debt/equity) greater than zero, is then given by the normal distribution function 
F(µ, σ; 0), with the mean of log (mortgage debt/equity)  denoted by µ and its standard deviation 
by σ.  As the mean of the distribution shifts to the right, the area under the tail increases 
proportionately more than does the mean.  This is illustrated in Figure 8 which shows the 
proportion of mortgages with negative equity as the area under the right tail of the distribution 
of log (mortgage debt/equity).  The figure makes it clear that, say, a five percent rise in 
average debt to equity, shifting the distribution to the right, would result in a much more than 
five percent increase in the area under the tail. 
For the log-normal distribution, there is a relationship between the mean of log debt, 
which we do not observe, and the log of mean debt, which we do observe; and, correspondingly 
for the mean of log equity.15 The logistic function is a good approximation to the normal, with a 
simple distribution function which depends on two parameters.16 Given data on the ratio of mean 
debt to mean equity, and estimates based on micro data of the proportion of households with 
negative equity, these
 
parameters can be calibrated to match the estimated proportion of negative 
equity based on micro data. This equation should yield a good time-series approximation to the 
most important non-linearity in the relationship between the aggregate or regional rate of 
possessions and the means of its fundamental drivers. A further advantage is that if later 
estimates of negative equity based on micro data become available, the relationship could be 
recalibrated for improved accuracy.  
 The probability associated with the simultaneous occurrence of a bad debt to equity 
position and a ‘bad trigger’ can be written as the product of the probability of ‘bad debt to equity’ 
and the probability of a ‘bad trigger’ given ‘bad debt to equity’. Modelling the log of the 
probability, i.e. the log possessions rate, results in an additive model.  If the two events were 
independent, the log possessions rate would be given by a function of (debt/equity) plus a 
                                                 
15
 It is well-known that if X is log normally distributed, then log EX=E log X + 0.5Var log X = µ + 0.5σ2. 
16
 In technical terms, this can be expressed by expression (4), implying:  
  0proportion of negative equity =  1 / (1 exp(  (log(mean debt/mean equity) ))λ λ+ − −     
where λ0 is half the difference in the variances of log debt and log equity.   
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function of the means of the variables appearing in the trigger function, e.g. the debt service ratio 
and unemployment.  This suggests a log-linear formulation in which the log possessions rate is 
driven by the log of the unemployment rate, the log of the debt service ratio and the log of the 
imputed proportion with negative equity. In addition, without data on the aggregate credit score, 
an aggregate loan quality indicator is needed. 
 To summarise, the theory suggests the probability of possession in the UK is the result 
of the simultaneous occurrence of two factors: a vulnerable debt to equity position and a 
trigger factor including elements such as cash-flow problems with debt service payments and 
unfavourable expectations for an improvement. A rational borrower would not default on a 
mortgage just because of cash-flow problems if the equity cushion relative to debt was 
sufficient to allow trading down or out. Similarly, someone able to meet mortgage payments 
is unlikely to seek possession: UK borrowers who default face a high probability of being 
pursued for their unpaid debt in the future and of being denied access to credit for at least 
some years.  The fraction of households with a vulnerable debt to equity position can be 
summarized by the estimated proportion in negative equity.  Finally, there are good reasons 
for thinking that the relationship between the proportion of possessions cases, and the 
proportion in negative equity, the unemployment rate and the debt-service ratio is 
approximately log-linear. 
 
3.2 An Empirical Model for Regional Mortgage Possessions 
 
The theory set out above suggests that at the regional as well as at the national level, the log 
proportion of mortgages going into possession should be approximately determined by three 
economic variables, and by forbearance policy and loan quality.  The three economic 
variables are the log proportion of mortgages in negative equity, the log debt-service ratio and 
the log unemployment rate.  In practice, possession can be initiated by mortgage borrowers or 
by lenders. Given information asymmetries between them and different objectives, the 
possession probability will not have exactly the same relationship with economic 
fundamentals for borrower or lender-initiated possessions. Indeed, Aron and Muellbauer 
(2010) found that for aggregate UK data, voluntary possessions were more sensitive to 
lending quality and the debt service ratio than was the case for the total rate of possessions. 
However, one would still expect the same set of economic fundamentals to be operative in 
both cases. As Ford et al. (1995) observe, for households in possession to obtain access to 
local authority housing, possession has typically to be the result of court proceedings.17 
                                                 
17
 In an attempt to reduce inconsistencies in the application of rules across local authorities, the 
Department of Communities and Local Government issued supplementary guidance for local 
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We do not observe possessions as such at the regional level but have data on court 
claims (actions), court orders and suspended court orders which we can express as rates by 
dividing by the estimated number of mortgages in each region.  One would expect the relative 
role of the different drivers to be different for claims than for court orders.  It seems likely, for 
example, that claims would be more driven by cash flow problems than by negative equity.  
Many claims will be triggered by mortgage payment problems; but only in the more serious 
and intractable cases will the claim be followed by a court order. 
Thus, we hypothesize that in the ith region the log proportion of court claims or 
orders, in the long run, can be expressed by the following equation:   
 
log(court claims or orders rate)it =  regional fixed effecti + a1  log(debt service ratio)it  
+ a2 log (proportion of negative equity)it + a3 log( unemployment rate)it  
+ a5 (lending quality index)t + a6 (forbearance policy index)t                                                        (1) 
 
This equation says court claims or orders can be explained by the variables on the right hand 
side. The three fundamental economic drivers are the debt service ratio (the product of the 
mortgage interest rate and the level of debt divided by disposable income); an estimate of the 
incidence of negative equity (based on the ratio of average mortgage debt to average home 
prices); and the unemployment rate. The estimates of negative equity in each region are based 
on the existence of a stable non-linear relationship, see section 3.1, between the mean of the 
distribution of the log debt/equity ratio and the proportion of mortgages in the tail where debt 
exceeds equity, calibrated to estimates of regional negative equity for 1992 and 2009. The 
equation for every region includes a factor specific to that region as a 'fixed effect', to capture 
long-run regional differences in age and occupational structure, in tax rates, in the ownership 
of financial assets and inequality.   
A priori, it is possible that regional fixed effects might be sufficient to capture the 
idiosyncratic long-run features of each region, given rich enough region-specific economic 
controls and regionally heterogeneous short term dynamics. However, it is important to check 
the pooling restriction on the slope parameters of the long-run model.  Thus, panel estimates 
with fixed effects are compared for panels of different sizes, for example with a north-south 
division of regions.   
The dynamic adjustment of the court claims rate to the long-run solution is not 
instantaneous so that an ‘equilibrium correction’ form, incorporating the above long-run 
relationship captures these dynamics. Included in the ‘equilibrium correction’  model is the 
                                                                                                                                            
authorities in 2009 on assessing whether households losing their home due to mortgage difficulties are 
intentionally or unintentionally homeless,  
http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/housing/intentionalhomelessnessguide. 
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lagged adjustment of the log court claims (actions) rate to the long-run fundamentals, the 
short-run dynamics in the log proportion of negative equity, log house prices, the log debt 
service ratio and the log unemployment rate, and the loan quality index and the forbearance 
policy function.18 The speed of adjustment to equilibrium and other short-run dynamics all   
vary by region.  The equations include a few dummy variables for outliers.  
The fitted values of the forbearance policy and lending quality indices from Aron and 
Muellbauer (2010) are employed in the model (Figure 9). Both the indices are simple 
functions of dummy variables. For example, for forbearance policy, a step dummy equal to 
one from 1992Q1 and zero before captures the end of 1991 policy shift. A smoothed step 
dummy which moves gradually from zero in 1996Q4 to one in 1998Q4, captures the return to 
normal, imposing the restriction that the 1991 shift is eventually cancelled out. The recent shift in 
2008 was captured with a step dummy beginning in 2008Q4. Since the 2008 Mortgage Pre-
action Protocol would have introduced delay on possessions procedures, and implies a partial 
reversal after a few quarters of the initial impact of the policy shift, lags of this dummy were 
introduced in Aron and Muellbauer’s estimated policy function to capture these possibilities.  
The data suggest that court orders fell more sharply than CML possessions from the beginning of 
2009, Figure 4, than can be easily explained by this policy function and the economic variables 
and so a step dummy beginning in 2009Q1 was introduced.  The evidence is that by 2010Q3 
most of this additional effect had faded. 
The ‘loan quality’ indicator does not measure the initial quality of loans but the later 
impact of quality change on possessions. Lending standards tend to have gradual effects on 
aggregate mortgage defaults: heterogeneity of individual borrowers and of lender behaviour 
tends to result in a smoothing of the response of aggregate default rates to evolving quality of 
lending.  It could also result in heterogeneity across regions to the extent that lenders such as 
Northern Rock, whose lending quality deteriorated, may have had larger market shares in 
some regions than others. The ‘loan quality’ index represents two factors in addition to loan 
quality. The first is increased access to refinancing opportunities which can mask an underlying 
deterioration in loan quality, as was probably the case in the 2005 to mid-2007 period. This 
accounts for a small but otherwise counter-intuitive fall, i.e. improvement, in the index in this 
period (Figure 9). The second is income support policy for borrowers with payment difficulties, 
which improved from the end of 2008, resulting in a fall in the index. Examples are the policy 
shifts announced in late 2008, offering more generous income support for the unemployed 
                                                 
18  This is illustrated for the log court claims rate as follows: 
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with mortgages and those already on Pension Credit and Income Support, and the Mortgage 
Rescue Scheme. 
Lending quality and forbearance policy shifts are assumed to be primarily national 
features common to all regions. This is clearly an approximation. Between 2007 and 2009, 
close to half of mortgages were of the ‘self-certification’ type, where careful income checks 
were not carried out. There are no data on the regional incidence of such loans which might 
have offered clues on regional variations in lending quality. Qualitative information suggests 
substantial variations in the regional incidence of buy-to-let lending after 2000. Press reports 
suggest loans on speculative apartment developments, e.g. in cities such as Leeds and 
Manchester, have soured as rental demand could not sustain cash flows. Fewer such problems 
have been reported for London.  
 While maintain the assumption that forbearance policy had a homogeneous effect across 
regions, there are thus reasons to believe that the different regional incidence of buy-to-let 
lending may have caused some regional heterogeneity in lending quality in recent years.19 A 
time dummy differing by regions is therefore added to this specification from 2003. We also 
test the restriction that forbearance policy was fully normalised by the end of 1998 by introducing 
a smoothed 1997 dummy. The above long-run form of the equation is thus augmented by the 
following term: a97(sdmm97t) + a03i(sdmma03t) + a09(sd2009q1t), see definitions in Table 
2.  In the panel context, a03 is allowed to vary by region, but a97 and a09 are assumed 
identical across regions. 
 
4. Estimation Results of Regional Mortgage Possessions Models 
 
The analysis begins with data for all of England and Wales in Section 4.1. Regional 
divergences in court data and in the key economic drivers are discussed in Section 4.2. 
Regional panel data models are estimated for court claims and orders in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. 
 
4.1 Modelling England and Wales aggregate court data: a first approach    
 
Aggregate court data for England and Wales are modelled using aggregate UK explanatory 
variables.  This is a reasonable approximation to modelling with aggregate data for England 
and Wales since Scotland and Northern Ireland account for only around 10 percent of 
mortgages and of population. Beginning with aggregate court claims for England and Wales, 
                                                 
19 As far as we are aware, there are no data on buy-to-let lending by region (e.g. they are not produced 
by the CML), so the heterogeneity of buy-to-let lending cannot be verified. Research at the FSA, 
communicated by John Longbottom suggests that properties potentially suitable for renting have 
experienced disproportionately high possessions rates leading to postcodes with high concentrations of 
possession orders. 
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compared to the long-run solution for the proportion of possessions as measured by CML in 
Aron and Muellbauer (2010), the long-run effect of loan quality is similar, but the forbearance 
policy effect is larger, and both indices are strongly significant (Table 3, columns 1-2). This is 
consistent with the finding of Aron and Muellbauer that forbearance policy has no effect on 
the voluntary possessions included in the CML possessions count, but which are largely 
excluded from the court data. This suggests that court data should show larger forbearance 
effects. The smoothed dummies for 1997 and 2003 have only marginal effects, but the step 
dummy for 2009 is significant, suggesting that the (relative) impact of (recent) increased 
forbearance policy on court claims is proportionately somewhat greater than on CML 
possessions.      
The long-run effects of the debt service ratio and the proportion in negative equity, 
each entering as four-quarter moving averages, are both estimated to be somewhat lower than 
for the CML possessions rate, but the unemployment effect is estimated to be somewhat 
larger, though still not very precisely determined20. In the dynamics, there are strong effects 
from the previous year’s increase in the log debt service ratio and in the log unemployment 
rate.  The dynamics also include the deviation from a past moving average of the proportion 
in negative equity, taken to be the 8-quarter moving average of eight quarters previously. 
Similar terms are later found to be relevant for the regional court claims and orders data.  One 
possible interpretation of such a variable is as an adjustment for measurement bias in the 
estimate of negative equity.  If the measurement bias is persistent, it will be present in the 
lagged moving average so that taking the deviation from a lagged moving average removes 
much of the bias. 
A check on the stability of these parameter estimates is obtained by running the 
equation to the end of 2002, so excluding the recent cycle.  The results are displayed in 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.  All the parameter estimates are well within one standard error of 
the estimates to 2010Q1 so that stability is satisfactory. 
The equation for the log court orders rate has a very similar structure and again finds 
strong loan quality and forbearance policy effects with evidence of a stronger negative effect 
on court orders from 2009 than found for CML data (Table 3, columns 5-6).  The long-run 
coefficients for the log proportion in negative equity and for the log unemployment rate are 
larger than for court claims, but the log debt service ratio has a similar effect.  The long-run 
effect of log negative equity at around 0.2, with a t-ratio over 6, is still somewhat lower than 
                                                 
20 A more precise measurement might be achieved using unemployment among those over 25. Only 23 
percent of mortgaged households are under 35 years of age, according to DCLG; moreover, the recent 
rise in unemployment has been mainly among the young. Duration of unemployment effects, using 
unemployment over 3 or 6 months, might also help pin down this effect.  However, lack of historical 
data at the regional level on the age and duration composition of unemployment makes it infeasible to 
check these hypotheses. 
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for the CML data modelled by Aron and Muellbauer (2010).  The dynamics show a similar 
effect for the deviation of the proportion in negative equity from a lagged moving average, 
and even more pronounced effects from the rise in the debt service ratio and the 
unemployment rate in the previous two years than found in the court claims equation. A check 
on parameter stability estimating on data to the end of 2002 shows very satisfactory results, 
with each long-run parameter within one standard error of its full-sample estimate. 
It is also possible to model the court order rate conditional on court claims.  The 
hypothesis of a one-for-one long run effect of claims on orders can be rejected: the coefficient 
is only just over one half (results available on request). Since court claims respond to the 
same fundamentals, though with not quite the same relative influences, the coefficients on 
loan quality, forbearance policy and the three economic drivers would all be expected to be 
lower than in the court orders equation not including a court claims effect.   This is the case 
and indeed, the forbearance policy effect now vanishes.  This is consistent with the fact that 
its coefficient was over twice as large in the claims equation as in the orders equation that 
excluded a court claims effect. However, the negative equity effect remains large, which is 
consistent with its relatively weak showing in the court claims equation but its strong effect in 
the court orders equation excluding a court claims effect. 
 
4.2    Regional Contrasts 
 
To compare court across regions it is necessary to scale by the number of outstanding 
mortgages in each region.21 Figure 5 shows four panels of data for each of the eight regions. 
The court orders rate for Greater London mostly exceeded the average and rose earlier than in 
other regions in 2002-07, then falling more sharply. Some regional differentials can be 
explained by differences in the movement of house prices. The later onset of rising house 
prices in Northern regions and Wales accounts for the persistence of considerable negative 
equity beyond 2000, and the persistently above-average rates of court orders until 2004. The 
earlier rise for Greater London in the estimated incidence of negative equity after 2001 helps 
explain the earlier rise there in the court orders rate.   
The figure also shows unemployment rates compared to the national average. 
Regional differentials in unemployment rates narrowed in the 1990s, and then widened after 
2000.  While the unemployment rate in London declined less than in other regions in 2000-
07, the increases since 2007 in Northern rates proved substantially higher than in the three 
Southern regions. A related picture is presented by earnings data. The Southern regions, 
especially Greater London, lead the rises and falls in boom and recessionary periods. 
                                                 
21
 The data appendix explains how national figures on the number of mortgages were apportioned to 
the regions on the basis of regional CML data from the Survey of Mortgage Lenders on numbers of 
new mortgages, and linking to pre-1992 figures based on survey methods. 
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Unemployment has been persistently above average in the North, and Greater London. The 
rise in London after 1989 was more pronounced than in most regions and the unemployment 
rate remained persistently higher. This helps account for the above average rates of court 
orders in London and the North, and the below average rate in the South West.  However, 
differences in the debt service ratio are also important.  
Regional divergences in court claims (actions) rates follow a broadly similar pattern 
to those for court orders.  Figure 6 illustrates by showing rates of court claims for Greater 
London and the North compared to the average for England and Wales.  The sharply higher 
rate of court claims for London in 1989-1993 is apparent as it was for court orders, as is the 
persistence of relatively high rates for the North up to about 2003, while those for London 
again led the rise from 2002 onwards. 
Figure 7 illustrates regional variations in the ratio of suspended court orders to total 
orders, showing the ratio for Greater London and the North and for all regions. The volatility 
of the series at the regional level is notable, as is the rise in the ratio in London from 2008, in 
contrast to the North and the average of all regions.  Perhaps a lower incidence of problems in 
the buy-to-let market and an earlier recovery of house prices help explain the different 
behaviour of London. 
 
4.3 Modelling the Regional Rate of Court Claims (Actions)  
 
The regional panel specification for eight regions imposes homogeneity across regions on the 
five key long-run effects: loan quality, forbearance policy, the log debt service ratio, the log 
of the estimated proportion in negative equity and the log of the unemployment rate.  In other 
respects, including the speed of adjustment and the effects of short-term dynamics and of 
outliers, regional heterogeneity is permitted. In addition, some additional short-term dynamics 
are permitted in lagged rates of change of house prices. These are the four-quarter log changes 
in the own region and in London’s house price index lagged one quarter and five quarters. 
These are included as proxies for expected house price changes in the region, which should 
have a bearing on court proceedings for possession.  When lenders and indeed borrowers are 
optimistic about house price changes, there are better prospects for recovery from negative 
equity.  Even when borrowers have such serious cash flow problems that eventual possession 
looks likely, lenders may wish to hold off temporarily with the expectation of obtaining a 
better price later.  The well-known ‘ripple effect’ by which house price rises originating in 
London radiate out to other regions, with lags depending on the distance from London, 
suggest that price rises in London have useful predictive power and probably have been 
factored into house price expectations in each region.  It is also possible that measurement 
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errors in the estimated proportion in negative equity in each region can be compensated for by 
including these heterogeneous lagged house price changes. 
Table 4 shows the estimated long-run coefficients together with speeds of adjustment 
and the coefficients on the deviation of negative equity from the moving average of two years 
previously.  For the eight-region panel, the long-run coefficient for loan quality on court 
claims is 0.82, less than one standard error away from the coefficient of 1 for the CML 
possessions data from Aron and Muellbauer (2010).  The coefficient for forbearance policy is 
estimated at 2.09, significantly higher than the coefficient of 1 for the CML data.  This 
suggests that shifts in lenders’ forbearance have a more dramatic effect on court claims than 
on final possessions.  As we shall see later, this is further supported by the coefficient on 
forbearance policy found also for the court orders data.  The estimated equation includes a 
smoothed dummy for 1997 to capture a possible mis-specification in the forbearance policy 
index estimated on CML data.  Its coefficient is -0.27 (t=-3.0).  This implies a downward 
adjustment of -0.13 in the coefficient of 0.173 on the 1997 smoothed dummy incorporated in 
the forbearance policy index estimated on CML data22. The implication is that the return to 
pre-1992 levels of forbearance may have been less complete than assumed by Aron and 
Muellbauer (2010). The other possible adjustment concerns the policy shift from the end of 
2008.  The coefficient on a step dummy which is one from 2009Q1 and zero before, is -0.22 
(t=-3.4).  This is equivalent to a downward shift of -0.11 in the forbearance policy function.  
This could be an indication that on CML data up to 2009Q3, the beneficial effects of 
increased forbearance policy have been slightly underestimated or merely a difference in the 
effects on court data. 
The equation also incorporates the heterogeneous effects of a smoothed 2003 step 
dummy.  As noted earlier this could reflect deterioration in lending quality differing across 
regions, perhaps connected with Buy-to-let lending, but could partly incorporate a tightening 
of forbearance policy.  These effects are generally significant, with coefficients ranging from 
0.08 (t=1.1) in the South West, via 0.19 (t=2.7) in London, to 0.54 (t=7.0) in the North.  
Interestingly, the average effect for all regions implied by these estimates is far larger than the 
0.08 implied by the aggregate data for England and Wales discussed in section 4.1.  The 
aggregate data also failed to detect the probable shift in 1997 in the forbearance policy index 
and over-estimated the 2009 shift, compared to the regional panel data. 
Turning to the long-run effects of the economic variables, a coefficient of 0.90 (t=9.6) 
on the log debt service ratio is lower than the corresponding estimate of 1.86 for CML data, 
while the coefficient on the proportion in negative equity is far lower at 0.07 (t=4.2) 
compared to 0.72 for CML data.  However, the coefficient of 0.13 (t=1.9) on the log 
                                                 
22
 The calculation divides -0.27 by the estimated coefficient on the policy function of 2.09. 
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unemployment rate is not far from the imprecise estimate of 0.2 on CML data, but lower than 
the estimate for aggregate court data for England and Wales seen in Table 3.  As Table 4 
indicates, the coefficients on the deviations of the proportion in negative equity from the 
moving average of two years previously are mostly significant and show considerable 
variation across regions.  They are most significant in London and the South West.  The 
smaller level effect of negative equity compared to CML data makes good sense since court 
actions are more likely to be triggered initially by cash flow problems showing in arrears than 
by negative equity. 
The possibility that the three southern regions might exhibit distinctive behaviour is 
examined by running a three-region panel for them. Results are shown in the second pair of 
columns in Table 4. As far as loan quality and the forbearance policy effects are concerned, 
the coefficients are a little lower than in the eight-region panel, but within one standard error 
of those estimates.  The 1997 shift is no longer significant but the 2009 shift is estimated to be 
of a similar size.  For the economic variables, the only notable difference from the eight-
region panel is the larger coefficient of 0.31 (t=3.4) on the log unemployment rate, which is 
around two standard errors away from the point estimate for the larger panel.  This is a hint 
that perhaps the effects of unemployment may be larger for the southern regions than for the 
rest of the country.  It is possible that the proportion of long-term unemployed is higher 
outside the southern regions, so that the unemployment rate is a less sensitive cyclical 
indicator there. 
The stability of the findings is checked by running the estimates for the eight region 
panel to the end of 2002: see the last two columns of Table 4.   Only the estimated coefficient 
on the forbearance policy index is (just) over one standard error away from the full-sample 
estimates, while the other estimates are closer. 
 
4.4 Modelling Regional Court Orders  
 
The panel estimates for the log of the court order rate have the same overall structure as those 
for court claims discussed in the previous section, and are presented in Table 5.  Again, 
homogeneity across regions in the key long-run coefficients is imposed.  The coefficients for 
loan quality and forbearance policy are estimated to be close to the values of unity for the 
CML possessions data, which was not true for court claims.  This is gratifying since court 
orders are conceptually closer to possessions than court claims. The estimated effect of the 
smoothed dummy for 1997 in adjusting the forbearance policy index is -0.14, close to the  
-0.13 estimated for court claims.  However, the 2009 policy shift is estimated to be even 
larger at -0.37 than the -0.22 estimated for court claims.  This is a further indication that the 
CML estimates to 2009Q3 may have underestimated the size of the forbearance policy shift or 
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of the beneficial effects of the improvement in income support for those in payment 
difficulties23.  However, as discussed in section 5, updating the model to 2010 quarter 3 
reduces this estimated effect. 
The heterogeneous effects of the smoothed dummy for 2003 are again very 
significant, with an average effect far larger than the 0.15 implied by aggregate data for 
England and Wales, and entirely absent in the estimates for CML data.  The coefficients range 
from 0.14 (t=2.4) for London, via 0.25 (t=4.4) for the South West, to 0.46 (t=6.7) for the 
North.   
The long-run coefficients on the economic variables are higher than for court claims 
data.  For the log of the debt service ratio, the coefficient is 1.0 (t=11.1) not far from the 
aggregate England and Wales estimate of 1.1, but lower than the estimate for CML data of 
1.86.  For the log proportion in negative equity, the estimate is 0.19 (t=10.8), almost identical 
to the estimate for aggregate data for England and Wales, but far lower than the estimate for 
CML data of 0.72. However, the estimated coefficient for the unemployment rate of 0.26 
(t=4.4), though less than the aggregate England and Wales estimate of 0.42, is higher and 
more accurately estimated than the coefficient of 0.2 for the CML data.  However, it is less 
than one standard error away from the latter estimate.  The estimated coefficients on the 
deviation of the log proportion in negative equity from the moving average of two years 
previously vary regionally and are generally positive, and significant for half the regions. 
As discussed earlier, substantial fractions of court orders do not lead to actual 
possession. Hence one would expect court orders to be somewhat less sensitive to economic 
fundamentals than actual possessions. Also, CML possessions data include voluntary 
possessions some of which are excluded from the court orders data, and which are more 
sensitive to the debt service ratio and negative equity than possessions cases enforced through 
the courts.  This helps explain why court orders are less sensitive than CML possessions data 
to the debt service ratio and to negative equity.  
To check for the possibility that the southern regions might be distinctive, a three 
region panel was also run. The resulting estimates shown in Table 5 are well within one 
standard error of the eight-region panel estimates.  The coefficient on negative equity is 
marginally higher at 0.22 (t=7.6) compared to 0.19 for the eight region panel.  The 
unemployment rate coefficient is also marginally higher at 0.29 (t=3.3) vs. 0.26 for the eight 
region panel.  The coefficient on the smoothed 1997 dummy is now not significant, though 
                                                 
23 However, one contributing factor could be due to a difference in the negative equity estimates in the 
present paper from Aron and Muellbauer (2010).  The latter paper adjusts negative equity estimates by 
subtracting possessions cases for the previous two years from the negative equity estimate based on the 
average debt to equity ratio.  This would imply a sharper drop in 2009-10 in the estimated proportion in 
negative equity and so attribute more of the reduction in recent possessions to this factor.  This 
adjustment has not been carried out in the present paper since we do not have accurate estimates of 
regional possessions rates. 
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only around one standard error away from the eight region estimate.  The estimated 2009 shift 
in forbearance policy or income support policy is -0.30 (t=-4.4), compared to -0.37 for the 
eight region panel. 
The stability of the findings is again checked by running the estimates to the end of 
2002.   Most parameter estimates are well within one standard error away from the full-
sample estimates.  However, the coefficient on loan quality is estimated at 1.60 with a 
standard error of 0.20 which differs from the full sample estimate of 1.15 with a standard 
error of 0.21.  The effect of the smoothed dummy for 1997 is more negative at -0.27 (standard 
error 0.069) compared to -0.15 (standard error 0.064) for the full sample.  The two findings 
are related: imposing the more plausible full sample coefficient of -0.15 on the smoothed 
dummy for 1997 brings down the loan quality coefficient to 1.36, far closer to the full sample 
estimate of 1.15. 
              A discussion of the impact of the long-run effects of the driving variables on the log 
court orders rate is postponed to the forecasting section, Section 5, using a figure that explains 
the contribution of different factors under the base scenario forecasts of the economic and 
policy environment, both for the estimation and forecasting periods.   
 
5. Forecast Results from Regional Court Orders Models 
 
To forecast orders for mortgage possession in the eight regions, we first update the data to the 
third quarter of 2010 and re-estimate the model.  The parameter estimates for the full system 
are close to those for data up to 2010Q1.  The main exception is the estimated 2009 shift in 
forbearance policy or income support policy: it drops from -0.37 to around -0.25.  The 
comparison of fitted and actual values for 2010Q3 is suggestive: while the model implies a 
continued decline in the court order rate, in all regions the court order rate actually rose in the 
third quarter.  This appears not to be the result of mis-specified short term dynamics since a 
very general lag structure has been used for the econometric specification. It raises the 
possibility that an underlying deterioration might have begun in some combination of 
forbearance policy and of loan ‘quality’, which, as noted above is actually a mix of three 
factors: riskiness of lending in previous years, income support policy for mortgage borrowers 
with payment difficulty and access to refinancing opportunities. It is also possible that 
mortgage lenders have begun to take a more pessimistic view of prospects for the housing 
market and of the economy.  
The rise in the numbers of court orders in all regions in 2010Q3, combined with a rise 
in the proportion of main-stream bank and building societies originating such orders, raises 
intriguing questions about the causes and implications for the future. It appears to coincide 
with a more negative view by lenders of prospects for house prices, household finances and 
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policy support.  A moderate reversal of some mix of forbearance and lending quality 
beginning in 2010Q3 is plausible. It was announced in the June 2010 Budget that from 
October 2010 the standard rate of interest used to calculate payments of borrowers eligible for 
Support for Mortgage Interest (SMI), frozen at 6.08 percent since late 2008, would be based 
on the average mortgage rate published by the Bank of England, initially 3.63 percent. After 
that, changes to the standard rate will be triggered when the standard rate and the Bank of 
England published average mortgage rate differ by at least 0.5 percent. Since these payments 
are made directly to mortgage lenders, this reduces the subsidy to mortgage lenders with 
customers in receipt of SMI. Further, around half of claimants or about 110,000, according to 
the Department for Work and Pensions, are liable for additional payments since their 
contracted interest rates exceed 3.63 percent. It seems likely that a disproportionate number of 
these were paying higher rates being regarded as riskier prospects by their mortgage lender, 
so their default risk is therefore higher. The change reduces the incentive for lenders to 
practice forbearance and increases payment stress on some borrowers. Rates of possessions 
may be somewhat higher than they would have been as a result of this policy change or 
‘normalisation’.24  
It is possible that the rise in court orders for mortgage possession seen in 2010Q3 
anticipates some of these consequences. If this interpretation is correct, a more permanent 
shift in court order rates is likely to be seen.  In the model, a step dummy, beginning in 
2009Q1 with a negative coefficient, reflects the additional effect on court order rates 
compared to CML possessions figures of greater forbearance and income support practiced 
since January 2009.  Estimating to 2010Q3, its coefficient is -0.32 (compared to -0.37 
reported in Table 5) if we also include a step dummy beginning in 2010Q3, whose coefficient 
is estimated at 0.28, which annihilates most of the effect of the 2009Q1 step dummy from 
2010Q3 onwards.  It seems implausible that there should be such a large shift in a single 
quarter and moreover, in anticipation of a policy shift which only impacts from 2010Q4.  It is 
assumed therefore in all the forecast scenarios that two thirds of a long-term shift towards a 
higher court order rate comes into effect in 2010Q3 and one third in 2010Q4.25 Considerable 
uncertainty surrounds the likely consequences for court orders of the normalisation of the 
standard mortgage rate for SMI and of the impact of the two-year limit on access to SMI.  It is 
likely that at least two more quarters of data will be needed before this uncertainty is 
substantially reduced. 
Four forecast scenarios are considered. The underlying assumptions are given in 
Table 6, and forecast data are recorded in an Annex for the base scenario, for two regions, the 
                                                 
24
 The previous government had announced the intent, but not the timing, of such a normalisation. 
25
 By imposing a coefficient of 0.2 on the 2010Q3 step dummy and a coefficient of 0.1 on the lag of 
this step dummy. 
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greater South (the South East excluding London, plus the East) and the greater North (North 
East plus North West). In the first of these scenarios, we take Oxford Economics central 
forecasts for the UK mortgage interest rate, the total mortgage stock and the number of 
mortgages, combined with their regional forecasts for house prices, unemployment rates on 
the LFS definition and average earnings.  The second and third consider more positive and 
more negative variants applied uniformly across regions. The fourth ‘mixed’ scenario is one 
in which the three more southerly regions do better than the five more northerly regions but 
the base scenario forecasts are assumed for the interest rate and the growth of the mortgage 
stock.  
Figure 10 illustrates the base scenario forecast by combining forecast and actual data 
from 2000 to the end of 2015 for the mortgage rate, the average mortgage, house prices, 
average earnings and unemployment rates for the greater South and the Greater North. The 
figure shows that mortgage rates are expected to remain low for an extended period before 
rising moderately to 4.2 percent at the end of 2012, 4.9 percent at the end of 2013, 5.9 percent 
at end 2014 and 6.1 percent in 2015.  The Southern unemployment rate is expected to peak at 
6.7 percent in 2011Q3 before declining gradually to 5.1 percent at the end of 2015.   
However, in the North, it peaks at 9.3 percent in 2011Q3 before declining to 7.7 percent. 
House prices in all regions are expected to decline slightly in early 2011, before gradually 
rising, by about 20 percent by end-2015 in the South and 15 percent in the North. Regional 
mortgage stocks are assumed to increase at the UK rate. 
Given these assumptions, plus the assumptions about loan ‘quality’ and forbearance 
policy used in Aron and Muelbauer (2010),26 and the removal by 2010Q4 of most of the fall 
in court orders attributed to the additional quality and forbearance factor introduced in 
2009Q1, regional outcomes for the court order rate under the base scenario are as shown in 
the eight panels of Figure 11 (Tabulated in Table 7). The ‘headline’ news is that under these 
assumptions the fall in court order rates is largely over in the three more southerly regions but 
may have a little further to run in 2011 and 2012 in most of the other regions as house prices 
rise.  After 2012, the higher rates of increase of earnings and house prices, and the lower 
forecasts of unemployment rates in the more southerly regions, imply a smaller rise in court 
orders in southerly than in northerly regions, when mortgage interest rates start increasing 
after 2012.  
A graphical decomposition of the estimated long-run effects of the different economic 
variables and policy variables both for the estimation and the forecast period is shown in 
Figure 12 for the South region and the North region. The figure shows the fitted long-run 
                                                 
26 See Figure 8 in Aron and Muellbauer (2010) for a visual display. This builds in a slight improvement 
in loan quality beyond 2010 as more cautious lending since mid 2007 begins to affect the mortgage 
stock. 
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contribution of the log debt service ratio, the combined effect of log negative equity and its 
deviation from the lagged eight-quarter moving average, the log unemployment rate and 
finally, the combined effects of the loan quality and forbearance indices including the 1997, 
2003 and 2009Q1 dummies and 2010Q3 dummies. The figure suggests that over the forecast 
horizon, the projected rise in interest rates from late 2012 onwards will be the main driver of 
the eventual forecast rise in the court orders rate.  The role of the unemployment rate and of 
negative equity under this central set of assumptions is relatively subdued.  However, the 
assumed deterioration in the mix of policy in the last two quarters of 2010 is important in 
explaining the approximate stabilization of the orders rate in the South and the temporary halt 
in the decline of the orders rate in the North.  
Figure 12 accounts for the rather different regional experiences in the 1990s 
recession, as compared to the recent recession. The North experienced a smaller and later rise 
in the court orders rate than the South in the 1990s. This was largely due to the initial lack of 
negative equity but also because of lower levels of debt relative to income. After 2005, the 
rise in the court orders rate in the North was to a similar peak as in the early 1990s, while the 
rise in the South was to a level far below the 1990s peak. This can be attributed mainly to 
greater deterioration in loan quality and a greater rise in negative equity in the North. 
Variations in the unemployment rate played a significant role but were clearly not a 
dominating influence. 
To illustrate alternative assumptions, consider two variants around the base economic 
scenario. Table 6 sets out the different scenario assumptions for shifts in the level of the 
mortgage interest rate and the unemployment rates, and for shifts in growth rates of house 
prices, earnings, and the mortgage stock. In the positive variant, mortgage rates stay low for 
longer and then rise less strongly, unemployment falls sooner, house prices and earnings rise a 
little more strongly, and the mortgage stock expands a little more. The negative variant 
assumes that interest rates rise sooner and remain high and otherwise makes the opposite 
assumptions to those in the positive scenario. Implicit in this is that higher interest rates are a 
major cause of slow growth. This is quite different from a situation where the MPC is able to 
respond to low growth by keeping interest rates low.  Rather, inflation concerns or a rise in 
gilt yields due to a dislocation of bond markets is assumed to have forced mortgage rates 
higher in this scenario.   The positive and negative variants simply assume that all regions are 
affected uniformly by these alternative assumptions.  
As shown in Figure 11, the positive scenario, in which unemployment rates are 0.5 
percentage points below the base scenario from mid-2013 and in which by end 2013, the 
mortgage rate is 1.8 percentage points below the base scenario, and in which annual house 
price growth is 3 percent higher and earnings growth 2 percent higher from 2011Q2, shows 
substantially lower levels of future court orders in all regions.  In contrast, in the negative 
26 
 
scenario, unemployment rates are 1 percentage point higher than in the base projection, from 
mid-2012, the mortgage interest rate is 1.8 percentage points higher, house price growth is 3 
percent lower and earnings growth 2 percent lower.  Unsurprisingly, court order rates rise 
sharply from late 2012 under these assumptions. 
Finally, a regionally divergent variation is examined, labeled the ‘mixed scenario’. A 
greater rise in unemployment rates in Northerly regions than in the three Southerly regions is 
assumed and correspondingly weaker housing and labour markets so that, on average, the UK 
forecast is achieved.  Thus, the same path for the mortgage interest rate is assumed as in the 
base forecast. However, for the three Southerly regions the unemployment rate and earnings 
take on the same path as in the positive scenario above, while for the five more Northerly 
regions the unemployment rate and earnings take on the path assumed for the negative 
scenario. The deviation of house price growth from the base scenario is assumed to be 
intermediate between positive and base scenarios for the Southerly regions, and intermediate 
between negative and base scenarios for the other five regions. This is because house prices 
are also driven by the UK mortgage interest rate and this is the same as in the base scenario. 
Figure 11 shows the forecasts for the three Southerly regions are intermediate between those 
in the base and in the positive scenarios already considered, while those for the five Northerly 
regions are intermediate between the base and the negative scenario above.  In both cases, the 
outcomes are a little closer to the base scenario than to the positive and negative scenarios 
already considered. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The analysis of regional data on court claims and court orders to investigate empirically the 
influence of variations in the macroeconomic and the regional economic environment on 
these indicators of mortgage default broadly confirms the conclusions of Aron and 
Muellbauer (2010) for national CML data. The debt service ratio is the most important 
determinant of court claims and orders, followed by negative equity, and with the 
unemployment effect relatively somewhat smaller.  However, the estimates of the 
unemployment effect for court orders are significant and more accurately estimated than for 
aggregate CML data. This is one of the beneficial outcomes of analysing regional panel data 
with distinctive regional variations in the unemployment rate. Modelling regional court orders 
and UK possessions and arrears jointly may, in future, bring forecasting gains for all three 
types of data.  
The loan quality and policy indicators developed in Aron and Muellbauer (2010) 
work well, though some modifications were introduced to reflect the different dynamics of the 
court data. Three modifications were found significant. The first is a shift in the forbearance 
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policy index in 1997, offsetting part of the increased toughness implied by the estimates based 
on CML data.  The second is a shift in 2009, suggesting a bigger impact of increased 
forbearance and/or of more generous income support for borrowers with payment problems 
than implied by estimates for CML data up to 2009Q3.  However, on court orders data up to 
2010Q3, it seems that most of this shift has now been eliminated. The notable rise in the court 
order rate in all regions in 2010Q3 may be linked to a more pessimistic outlook by mortgage 
lenders for the housing market, the economy and for policy support. One example of the latter 
is the normalisation of the statutory interest rate for income support for borrowers with 
payment difficulties, announced in June 2010, to take effect from October 1, 2010. As 
discussed in the previous section, this reduces somewhat the forbearance incentives of lenders 
and financial pressure on borrowers. 
 The third modification is to introduce a regionally varying factor beginning in 2003 
to reflect the regionally heterogeneous shift in loan quality and possibly forbearance policy 
probably connected with the differing pattern of buy-to-let lending in the different regions. 
The inclusion of Receiver-of-Rent cases for buy-to-let loans and second mortgages in the 
court data but excluded in the CML data may also play a small role. It is curious, however, 
that this last factor and the 1997 shift are harder to detect on aggregate court claims and 
orders data for England and Wales, while proving to be significant for regional panel data.  
The forbearance policy index has a significantly larger effect on court claims compared 
to court orders. This suggests that the Mortgage Pre-Action Protocol has probably stopped a 
proportion of claims that would previously have been resolved later, between the court claim 
and the hearing, by borrowers paying off arrears or negotiating a new payment schedule with 
the lender by encouraging such contact before the court claim stage. The smaller effects from 
fundamentals, particularly negative equity, on claims compared with orders, was predictable, 
and strongly confirmed by the empirical results. The direction of differences in effects of 
economic fundamentals on court orders, as opposed to actual possessions as measured by 
CML data, was also predictable. Smaller coefficients were expected for court orders than for 
CML data, since many orders do not result in actual possessions, and one would expect those 
that do to be more sensitive to economic fundamentals. Furthermore, CML data include 
voluntary possessions which are more sensitive to the long-run economic fundamentals. Thus, 
the estimated long-run effect of the log debt service ratio on court orders was estimated to be 
only just over half of the effect for CML data.  The effect of the log proportion in negative 
equity on the log court order rate was estimated to be only around 30 percent of the estimate 
for CML data.  However, the models also included the deviation of the log proportion in 
negative equity from the moving average of two years previously, which is also a fairly 
persistent variable. The significance of this measure may reflect some measurement biases in 
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the negative equity indicator. For some regions at least, the sum of the coefficients on the two 
negative equity variables is around half of the estimate based on CML data.   
It has been suggested that the court figures are ‘leading indicators’ of subsequent 
possessions. However, this may be misleading especially when forbearance is common. 27 
There is a flow effect from new orders, but also a “stock” effect from past suspended orders. 
If payments due under a suspended possession order are not maintained, the lender can ask 
the court bailiff to evict the borrower without another hearing and without warning the 
borrower of their intentions. The stock effect can be important if the re-default rate is high. 
US data from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency suggest that the default rate from 
loans whose terms are changed for those in default is relatively high at 60-70 percent. Though 
British conditions are likely to be different, possessions could rise quickly without a sharp rise 
in new orders should economic conditions lead to borrowers being in breach of the conditions 
set out in their suspended order or in any agreement reached after an outright order has been 
obtained. Indeed, given the explanatory variables included in Aron and Muellbauer’s model 
for UK arrears and possessions, lagged values of the court orders rate for England and Wales 
prove to be statistically insignificant. 
The outlook for court orders for mortgage possessions at the regional level was analysed 
in the context of four different economic scenarios. The base scenario was based on forecasts 
of interest rates, regional unemployment, house prices, earnings and other variables from 
Oxford Economics. This suggests a slight further fall in court orders outside the southerly 
regions, but a slight rise in these three regions.  Given the importance of the mortgage interest 
rate, the upward drift in the forecast rate from end-2012, tends to drive up forecast court order 
rates in all regions from then to 2015.  However, with somewhat more optimistic forecasts of 
unemployment, wage growth and house price growth in the three southerly regions, the 
upward drift of forecast court orders is lower than in the Wales and the more northerly 
regions.  A positive variant with lower interest rates, lower unemployment rates and higher 
wage and house price growth shows court order rates continuing to decline everywhere.  A 
negative variant with the opposite (and not very likely) economic scenario shows court order 
rates exceeding the 2008 peaks.  In the final scenario, the base projection for interest rates is 
combined with a more negative economic outlook in the five northerly regions offset by a 
more positive economic outlook in the three southerly regions.  Because of the eventual 
upward drift of mortgage interest rates assumed in this forecast, court orders eventually rise 
even under the positive assumptions for the southerly regions. 
 The common assumption in all four economic scenarios is that a long-term shift 
towards a higher court order rate comes into effect in 2010Q3, and in 2010Q4.  This 
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 We are grateful to John Longbottom for discussion of this point. 
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assumption could be wrong both on the exact timing and on the magnitude of the long-run 
effect.  However, this is only one of the uncertainties regarding the outlook for court orders 
for mortgage possession. Uncertainties about the economic outlook and prospects for 
mortgage finance and hence refinancing possibilities for those with payment difficulties are 
probably even more important. 
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Figure 1: Aggregate possessions rates: total, voluntary and Buy-to-let (percentage  
of mortgages outstanding)  
 
 
Source: CML data; our interpolations of quarterly CML data are used before 1999, see Data Appendix. 
 
 
Figure 2: Court data on possessions for England and Wales: ratios of court 
claims (actions) and court orders as a percentage of mortgages 
outstanding, and ratio of suspended court orders to total court orders 
 
 
Source: Quarterly data from the Ministry of Justice.  Our interpolations of quarterly CML mortgage 
data are used before 1999, see Data Appendix. 
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Figure 3:  Court claims (actions), court orders and outright court orders (i.e. court 
orders minus suspended court orders) relative to the CML count of 
possessions 
 
 
 
Source: Quarterly data from the Ministry of Justice.  Our interpolations of quarterly CML possessions 
data are used before 1999, see Data Appendix. 
 
 
Figure 4:  UK mortgages in negative equity, the UK debt service ratio, UK 
unemployment, and the ratio of court orders to CML possessions. 
 
 
 
Source: Aron and Muellbauer (2010). Quarterly data from the Ministry of Justice.  Our interpolations 
of quarterly CML possessions data are used before 1999, see Data Appendix. 
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Figure 5:  Regional court orders, proportion in negative equity, debt service ratio 
and rate of unemployment, plotted against the aggregate of eight regions 
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East Midlands 
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Greater London 
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South West 
 
 
Wales 
 
 
Source: Quarterly court orders are from the Ministry of Justice. For construction of the denominator in 
the court orders ratio, regional mortgages, see Data Appendix. For constriction of regional measures of 
negative equity, the debt service ratio and unemployment rates, see the Data Appendix.  
KEY:  
RATORD= ratio of regional court orders to regional outstanding mortgages 
UP= regional unemployment     
LOGISTIC= proportion in negative equity 
NADS= debt service ratio 
Notes: The regional suffixes are: North (NT), Yorkshire and Humberside (YH), East Midlands (EM), 
West Midlands (WM), Greater London (GL), the South (ST), the South West (SW), and Wales (WW). 
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Figure 6:  Court claims (actions) as a ratio to outstanding mortgages for the 
aggregate of all eight regions, Greater London and the North. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Quarterly data from the Ministry of Justice.  Our interpolations of quarterly CML mortgage 
data are used before 1999, see Data Appendix. 
 
 
Figure 7:  Suspended court orders as a ratio to orders for the aggregate of all eight 
regions, Greater London and the North. 
 
 
Source: Quarterly data from the Ministry of Justice. 
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 Figure 8:  The impact of an increase in the average debt equity ratio on the  
  proportion of mortgages in negative equity 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
 
 
Figure 9:  Estimated loan quality and forbearance functions 
 
 
 
Source: Aron and Muellbauer (2010). 
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Figure 10:  Assumptions for the North (NT) and South (ST) regions in the base scenario 
 
 
North (NT) region:
 
 
South (ST) region: 
Note: in order, data shown are the unemployment rate, house prices, earnings, number of mortgages 
and the mortgage stock. 
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Figure 11:  Regional outcomes under various scenarios 
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Figure 12:  Decomposition of the estimated long-run effects of the economic and 
 policy variables for the estimation and the forecast periods. 
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Table 1:  Characteristics of the published County Courts data on court-ordered possessions  
Source Category Frequency and historical samples Units and seasonal 
adjustment 
Definition of coverage 
  Annual Quarterly   
Court-ordered possession actions England and Wales: 10 regions: East Midlands, Eastern, London, Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, Southwest, Wales, West 
Midlands and Humberside (Merseyside was differentiated in the earlier data pre-1998). 
MoJ Actions entered (no. of possession 
claims issued in the county courts) 
 
No. of Landlord possession claims  
1987 onward 
 
1989q2 onward 
See below for new 
disaggregated 
category. 
Both seasonally adjusted 
and non-seasonally 
adjusted  figures are given 
(adjustment using X12 
ARIMA). 
 
Data are disaggregated into 
court regions back to 1987. 
 
Comparability over time is 
affected by new court 
jurisdictions being 
incorporated. 
Mortgage data include all types of lenders whether 
local authority or private (e.g. banks and building 
societies). Landlord data include all types of landlord 
whether social or private sector, and cover actions 
made using both the standard and accelerated 
possession procedures. Voluntary repossessions are 
not included, except insofar that the property is 
surrendered after a claim is made by the lender or a 
court order is granted.  
 
Note: The mortgage possession figures do not 
indicate how many houses have actually been 
repossessed through the courts. Repossessions can 
occur without a court order being made while not all 
court orders result in repossession. 
MoJ Number of possession orders made 
(incl. suspended orders) 
 
No. of Landlord possession orders 
made (incl. suspended orders)  
1987-2008 
See below 
for change 
of definition. 
1990q1-2009q2 
See below for 
definitional change 
and new 
disaggregated 
category. 
MoJ Orders suspended 
 
No. of Landlord suspended orders  
1990 onward   1990q1 onward  
MoJ Charging orders applications made 2001 onward   
MoJ Charging orders granted  2001 onward  
Definitional differences in MoJ data introduced from August 2009 
MoJ Number of possession orders made 
(mortgage and landlord) and also 
suspended orders 
 
Note: no change in the definition of 
claims, see above. 
1999 onward 2004q1 onward 
 published; 
1999q1 onward 
 on request 
New, additional local 
authority level breakdown 
for the ‘orders’ and 
‘claims’ series, with the 
disaggregation based on 
the physical location of the 
property which is the 
subject of the possession 
action. 
Redefinition: 
Number of possession claims that lead to an order.  
This will eliminate all instances of multiple orders on 
the same claim. It will not eliminate all instances of 
multiple orders on a single household: a homeowner 
in arrears on more than one mortgage loan account 
could be subject to more than one claim (though this 
is likely to be a very small proportion). 
1. Neither the CML nor the Financial Services Authority (FSA) produce seasonally-adjusted measures. The MoJ suggests the seasonally-adjusted figures give a more 
meaningful picture of short-term, quarter-to-quarter changes (removing seasonal or other calendar influences such as court closures on public holidays). 
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Table 2:  Definitions of variables used in the regressions   
Symbol Definition Means    
  All 
regions 
NT YH EM WM ST GL SW WW 
 
 
Regional number of court claims 
(actions) / regional no. of mortgages 
outstanding, nmi.  
claims: MoJ; mortgages: CML 0.00236 0.00292 0.00259 0.00236 0.00290 0.00228 0.00319 0.00209 0.00309 
	

 
 
Regional number of court orders / 
regional number of mortgages 
outstanding, nmi. 
claims: MoJ; mortgages: CML 0.00174 0.00219 0.00191 0.00174 0.00205 0.00170 0.00240 0.00148 0.00224 

 
  
Regional unemployment rate (ILO ) 
unemployment rate : ONS 7.07 8.14 7.43 6.18 7.76 5.25 8.98 5.49 7.55 

 
 
Debt service ratio, or cost of loan to 
income, measured for each region as:  
( )(

  
)  
where arbm is the tax-adjusted 
interest rate, amwt is housing loans, 
and y is an interpolated measure of 
annual average earnings 
mortgages: CML; amwt: ONS 
rbm: ONS; y: ONS 0.169 0.147 0fs.139 0.146 0.155 0.206 0.220 0.173 0.145 
 
 
Debt equity ratio, measured to proxy 
average mortgage to house prices. 
Implied proportion of negative equity 
(normalised) 
 (see data appendix): 
 =
(1/(1 + exp (−λ(log *+, - + .)))  
 
where λ and F are calibration factors, 
see Data Appendix. 0.0509 0.0463 0.0486 0.0818 0.0324 0.0595 0.0528 0.0572 0.0478 
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hp: ONS 
sd2009q1     step dummy =1 from 2008Q4, and 0 
otherwise  
         
sd2010q3 step dummy =1 from 2010Q3, and 0 
otherwise 
         
tsdmmxx  Double moving average of step 
dummies, with a smooth increasing 
transition from zero to one over 8 
quarters, from zero in the last quarter 
of year xx-1, to one in the last quarter 
of year xx+1 
         
sdmm97 as above for 1997          
sdmm03 as above for 2003          
Notes:  
1. The sample is the longest available for the court data, 1987Q1 to 2010Q1.  
2. The regional suffixes are: North (NT), Yorkshire and Humberside (YH), East Midlands (EM), West Midlands (WM), Greater London (GL), the South (ST), the 
South West (SW), and Wales (WW). The Southern regions are defined as: the South, Greater London, and South West. The Northern regions are defined as: North, 
North West, Yorkshire & Humberside, West Midlands, East Midlands, and Wales. 
3. Number of mortgages: biannual CML mortgage data interpolated to quarterly data before 1999, see Data Appendix. 
4. Mortgage rate: from 2007Q1, FSA MLAR, Table 1.22 - Residential loans to individuals: Interest rate analysis. Overall weighted average interest rate on balances 
outstanding, all loans. From 2000 to 2006, linked to average of mortgage rate on balances outstanding for banks and building societies, previously reported in 
Financial Statistics. Before 2000, linked to average mortgage rate on balances outstanding for building societies, previously reported in Financial Statistics, code 
AJNL. 
5. House prices: mix-adjusted index for UK for all dwellings from DCLG website Table 594. 
6. Unemployment rates: use the Labour Force Survey definition, from ONS Labour Market Statistics Tables 18A and B from 1992 Q2; prior to this, regional unemployment 
rates from the ONS Claimant Count and Vacancies, Tables EGU3 and EGU4 are adjusted to the LFS basis using a regression method. Details in the Data Appendix. 
7. Earnings data: from the New Earnings Survey, linked in 1998 to ASHE data, and are April figures; spliced to 2004-2009 figures from Regional Trends as described in the 
Data Appendix. 
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Table 3:  Estimation results for aggregate court claims and orders in England and Wales, 1987q3-2010q1   
 
Variable Symbol 
Aggregate 
∆log (pclaims) 
 
Robust  
std. 
errors 
Aggregate 
∆log (pclaims) 
 
Robust 
std. 
errors 
Aggregate 
∆log (porders) 
 
Robust 
std. 
errors 
Aggregate 
∆log (porders) 
 
Robust 
std. 
errors 
  
1987-2010 1987-2002 1987-2010 1987-2002 
Constant a0 -5.56 0.803 -5.38 0.864 -4.82 0.443 -4.91 0.619 
log 
40 a1 0.769 0.217 0.958 0.287 1.07 0.105 0.976 0.190 
log 4  a2 0.089 0.0557 0.135 0.0601 0.197 0.0321 0.221 0.0368 
log 
01 a3 0.493 0.249 0.617 0.242 0.396 0.148 0.402 0.193 
Speed of adjustment a4 0.521 0.114 0.620 0.145 0.806 0.0883 0.804 0.107 
LQ (loan quality) a5 0.869 0.304 0.851 0.376 0.713 0.177 0.791 0.298 
PS (policy shift) a6 1.95 0.654 1.78 0.659 0.422 0.319 0.673 0.439 
Deviation of 
(iii) a20 0.134 0.0930 0.0849 0.111 0.0974 0.0464 0.0935 0.0665 
sd2009q1 a62 -0.370 0.158   -0.395 0.0900   
sdmm97 a97 -0.112 0.125 -0.0294 0.131 0.0211 0.0692 -2.62E-03 0.103 
sdmm03 a103 0.201 0.120   0.0848 0.0800  0.619 
Diagnostics          
Eq. standard error  0.0598  0.0648  0.0453  0.0450  
R squared  0.9780  0.98086  0.991  0.993  
Adj.R squared  0.9709  0.97006  0.987  0.988  
LM Het test P-val  0.993  0.927  0.180  0.191  
Durbin-Watson  2.25  2.27  2.12  2.55  
Log likelihood  140.47  96.06  169.27  122.87  
Notes:  
i. Estimates are reported to three significant figures.  
ii. Variables are defined in Table 2.  
iii. dev negeq = log negeqma4t-lognegeqma8t-8 
49 
 
Table 4:  Estimation results for regional court claims in England and Wales, 1987q3-2010q1  
 
Variable Symbol 
All regions 
 
 
∆log (pclaims) 
Robust  
std. 
errors 
All regions 
 
 
∆log (pclaims) 
Robust 
std. 
errors 
Southern 
regions 
 
∆log (pclaims) 
Robust  
std. 
errors 
  
1987-2010 1987-2002 1987-2010 
log 
40 a1 0.901 0.0940 1.06 0.108 0.947 0.103 
log 4  a2 0.070885 0.0168 0.102 0.0184 0.0595 0.0436 
log 
01 a3 0.126 0.0666 0.0107 0.0851 0.310 0.0913 
Speed of adjustment a4       
NT 
 0.401 0.0697 0.342 0.0774   
YH 
 0.353 0.0820 0.298 0.0939   
EM 
 0.487 0.0629 0.512 0.0697   
WM 
 0.593 0.0995 0.932 0.141   
GL 
 0.736 0.0717 0.947 0.108 0.703 0.0884 
ST 
 0.591 0.0587 0.729 0.0853 0.587 0.0923 
SW 
 0.524 0.0647 0.578 0.0754 0.538 0.102 
WW 
 0.630 0.0762 0.771 0.0987   
LQ (loan quality) a5 0.815 0.258 1.30 0.227 0.610 0.267 
PS (policy shift) a6 2.09 0.444 1.74 0.343 1.54 0.644 
Deviation of 
(iii) a20       
NT 
 -0.0105 0.0757 -0.0576 0.104   
YH 
 0.148 0.0717 0.0766 0.131   
EM 
 0.0645 0.0428 0.0232 0.0497   
WM 
 0.0492 0.0434 0.0869 0.0329   
GL 
 0.147 0.0233 0.109 0.0218 0.177 0.0314 
ST 
 0.0487 0.0295 -0.0216 0.0367 0.0147 0.0446 
SW 
 0.165 0.0304 0.146 0.0348 0.163 0.0475 
WW 
 0.146 0.0390 0.190 0.0546   
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sd2009q1 a62 -0.217 0.0631   -0.228 0.0858 
sdmm97 a97 -0.265 0.0888 -0.362 0.0833 -0.0927 0.0945 
sdmm03 a103       
NT 
 0.541 0.0768     
YH 
 0.347 0.0809     
EM 
 0.330 0.0792     
WM 
 0.414 0.0747     
GL 
 0.191 0.0715   0.0938 0.0846 
ST 
 0.437 0.0827   0.424 0.102 
SW 
 0.0799 0.0736   0.0191 0.0890 
WW 
 0.385 0.0668     
Diagnostics        
NT 
       
Eq. standard error  0.0746  0.0845    
R squared  0.925  0.868    
LM Het test P-val  .835  .96    
Durbin-Watson  1.94  1.86    
YH 
       
Eq. standard error  0.0660  0.0752    
R squared  0.947  0.921    
LM Het test P-val  .879  .93    
Durbin-Watson  1.96  1.99    
EM 
       
Eq. standard error  0.0781  0.0885    
R squared  0.951  0.943    
LM Het test P-val  .828  .98    
Durbin-Watson  1.73  1.66    
WM 
       
Eq. standard error  0.0678  0.0693    
R squared  0.958  0.955    
LM Het test P-val  .9  .828    
Durbin-Watson  1.94  1.97    
GL 
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Eq. standard error  0.0846  0.0923  0.0819  
R squared  0.969  0.971  0.971  
LM Het test P-val  .780  .229  .744  
Durbin-Watson  1.89  1.76  2.00  
ST 
       
Eq. standard error  0.0567  0.0624  0.0542  
R squared  0.982  0.983  0.983  
LM Het test P-val   [.027  .014  .040  
Durbin-Watson  1.81  1.64  1.96  
SW 
       
Eq. standard error  0.0775  0.0861  0.0753  
R squared  0.968  0.967  0.969  
LM Het test P-val  .911  .731  .821  
Durbin-Watson  1.971  1.833  2.07  
WW 
       
Eq. standard error  0.0884  .104    
R squared  0.917  0.879    
LM Het test P-val  .708  .811    
Durbin-Watson  1.92  1.71    
Notes:  
i. Estimates are reported to three significant figures. 
ii. Variables are defined in Table 2. 
iii. dev negeq = log negeqma4t-lognegeqma8t-8 
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 Table 5:  Estimation results for regional court orders in England and Wales, 1987q3-2010q1 
 
Variable Symbol 
All regions 
 
 
∆log (porders) 
 
Robust  
std. 
errors 
All regions 
 
 
∆log (porders) 
 
Robust 
std. 
errors 
Southern 
regions 
 
∆log (porders) 
 
Robust  
std. 
errors 
  
1987-2010 1987-2002 1987-2010 
log 
40 a1 1.15 0.0774 1.02 0.0938 1.01 0.0918 
log 4  a2 0.191 0.0182 0.209 0.0188 0.220 0.0282 
log 
01 a3 0.255 0.0623 0.257 0.0760 0.290 0.0964 
Speed of adjustment a4       
NT 
 0.422 0.0663 0.383 0.0882   
YH 
 0.501 0.0724 0.435 0.0768   
EM 
 0.811 0.0790 0.790 0.0789   
WM 
 0.817 0.0833 0.980 0.0864   
GL 
 0.954 0.0915 1.11 0.108 0.825 0.102 
ST 
 0.681 0.0577 0.805 0.0595 0.607 0.0634 
SW 
 0.821 0.0613 0.881 0.0700 0.779 0.0622 
WW 
 0.624 0.0795 0.588 0.0943   
LQ (loan quality) a5 1.15 0.209 1.60 0.210 1.04 0.226 
PS (policy shift) a6 0.989 0.301 1.26 0.323 0.969 0.365 
Deviation of 
(iii) a20       
NT 
 0.176 0.0758 0.170 0.128   
YH 
 0.0943 0.0656 0.214 0.0906   
EM 
 0.0620 0.0407 0.0561 0.0556   
WM 
 0.0137 0.0452 0.0137 0.0462   
GL 
 0.107 0.0305 0.0961 0.0301 0.149 0.0346 
ST 
 -0.0402 0.0428 0.0858 0.0205 0.0102 0.0613 
SW 
 0.0422 0.0313 0.0570 0.0361 0.104 0.0474 
WW 
 0.209 0.0574 0.189 0.0816   
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sd2009q1 a62 -0.371 0.0478   -0.298 0.0641 
sdmm97 a97 -0.153 0.0643 -0.266 0.0688 -0.0624 0.0762 
sdmm03 a103       
NT 
 0.462 0.0701     
YH 
 0.306 0.0663     
EM 
 0.428 0.0599     
WM 
 0.448 0.0608     
GL 
 0.141 0.0550   0.0455 0.0642 
ST 
 0.509 0.0974   0.406 0.121 
SW 
 0.253 0.0541   0.160 0.0711 
WW 
 0.348 0.0631     
Diagnostics        
NT 
       
Eq. standard error  0.0780  0.0818    
R squared  0.930  0.878    
LM Het test P-val  .707  231    
Durbin-Watson  2.19  2.24    
YH 
       
Eq. standard error  0.0826  0.0791    
R squared  0.9332  0.9195    
LM Het test P-val  .753  .377    
Durbin-Watson  1.58  1.81    
EM 
       
Eq. standard error  0.0920  0.0888    
R squared  0.942  0.946    
LM Het test P-val  .255  .394    
Durbin-Watson  2.01  2.13    
WM 
       
Eq. standard error  0.0906  0.0859    
R squared  0.937  0.941    
LM Het test P-val  .809  .840    
Durbin-Watson  1.80  1.79    
GL 
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Eq. standard error  0.0966  0.0972  0.0903  
R squared  0.972  0.978  0.976  
LM Het test P-val  .303  .855  .615  
Durbin-Watson  1.75  1.89  1.97  
ST 
       
Eq. standard error  0.0521  0.0407  0.0496  
R squared  0.989  0.995  0.990  
LM Het test P-val  [.146  .468  .487  
Durbin-Watson  1.93  2.39  2.21  
SW 
       
Eq. standard error  0.0818  0.0876  0.0778  
R squared  0.972  0.973  0.975  
LM Het test P-val  ..978  .574  .811  
Durbin-Watson  2.09  2.00  2.31  
WW 
       
Eq. standard error  0.1030  0.0968    
R squared  0.910  0.906    
LM Het test P-val  .065  .865    
Durbin-Watson  1.80  2.03    
Notes:  
i. Estimates are reported to three significant figures.  
ii. Variables are defined in Table 2. 
iii. dev negeq = log negeqma4t-lognegeqma 
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Table 6:  Scenarios for regional mortgages possessions forecasts 2010q4-2015q4 
 
EXOGENOUS 
VARIABLE 
 
SCENARIO 1 
Base 
SCENARIO 2 
Positive variant 
 
SCENARIO 3 
Negative variant 
SCENARIO 4 
Mixed  
Policy use base assumptions from Aron and Muellbauer (2010) 
Lending Quality use base assumptions from Aron and Muellbauer (2010) 
2003 dummy effect continues 
2009 dummy effect continues 
2010q3 dummy step dummy set to 1 from this date, to capture SMI changes from 1 October 2010 
No. of 
Mortgages, Nm 
nm = nmbase  nm = nmbase nm = nmbase arbm = arbmbase for all 
 
Southern region 
(ST, SW, GL): 2 
Scenario 2 assumptions but 
where the growth increments 
are halved for house prices 
and earnings 
 
Northern region 
(NT, YH, EM, WM, WW)s: 2 
Scenario 3 assumptions but 
where the growth increments 
are halved for house prices 
and earnings 
Unemployment  
Rate, ur 
ur = urbase  ur base+ positive 
increment 
urbase + negative 
increment 
Mortgage Rate, 
arbm  
arbm = 
arbmbase 
arbmbase + positive 
increment 
arbmbase + 
negative increment 
House Price, hp hp = hpbase  growth rate in base 
scenario has positive 
growth increment 
growth rate in base 
scenario has 
negative growth 
increment 
Earnings, y y = ybase growth rate in base 
scenario has positive 
growth increment 
growth rate in base 
scenario has 
negative growth 
increment 
Mortage Lending 
Stock, amwt 
amwt = 
amwtbase 
growth rate in base 
scenario has positive 
growth increment 
growth rate in base 
scenario has 
negative growth 
increment 
Notes:  
1. See the Annex for the values of the increments and of variables for some regions in the base 
scenario. 
2. The eight regions are:  the North (NT), Yorkshire and Humberside (YH), East Midlands (EM), West 
Midlands (WM), Greater London (GL), the South (ST), the South West (SW) and Wales (WW). The 
choice of regions is determined by the need for consistent regional boundaries since the government 
switched from Standard Statistical Regions (SSR's) to Government Office Regions (GOR's) in the mid 
1990's. The North region is the sum of the current North East and North West GOR's, which is the sum 
of the old North and North West SSR's. The South region is the sum of the South East and Eastern 
GOR's, which is the sum of the old Rest of South East (i.e. excluding Greater London) and East Anglia 
SSR. 
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Table 7:  Forecasts of regional orders for different scenarios over 2010q4-2015q4 
Forecast 
quarter 
Base 
Scenario  
Positive 
Variant 
Scenario  
Negative 
Variant 
Scenario  
Mixed 
Scenario  
Base 
Scenario  
Positive 
Variant 
Scenario  
Negative 
Variant 
Scenario  
Mixed 
Scenario  
Base 
Scenario  
Positive 
Variant 
Scenario  
Negative 
Variant 
Scenario  
Mixed 
Scenario  
REGION: SW REGION: ST REGION: GL 
2010q1 915 915 915 915 2810 2810 2810 2810 1865 1865 1865 1865 
2010q2 920 920 920 920 2820 2820 2820 2820 1715 1715 1715 1715 
2010q3 1030 1030 1030 1030 3120 3120 3120 3120 1805 1805 1805 1805 
2010q4 1029 1029 1029 1029 2856 2856 2856 2856 1880 1880 1880 1880 
2011q1 1085 1085 1085 1085 3111 3111 3111 3111 1920 1920 1920 1920 
2011q2 1063 1060 1078 1061 3178 3163 3288 3166 1923 1902 1995 1904 
2011q3 1065 1047 1106 1052 3251 3212 3488 3223 1914 1889 2044 1908 
2011q4 994 974 1085 980 3046 2980 3441 2997 1881 1840 2095 1854 
2012q1 1069 1027 1241 1044 3235 3071 3901 3144 1935 1844 2279 1891 
2012q2 1091 1029 1362 1054 3242 2975 4209 3097 1939 1800 2449 1880 
2012q3 1120 1018 1494 1070 3249 2885 4508 3070 1979 1775 2678 1884 
2012q4 1066 930 1510 1006 3023 2572 4432 2817 1963 1691 2838 1854 
2013q1 1166 959 1744 1085 3338 2631 5106 3074 2136 1695 3260 1988 
2013q2 1214 935 1898 1117 3493 2575 5544 3189 2223 1644 3576 2045 
2013q3 1276 910 2052 1162 3686 2518 5927 3339 2340 1598 3817 2129 
2013q4 1252 818 2044 1129 3614 2270 5866 3250 2406 1504 3987 2164 
2014q1 1409 853 2311 1259 4015 2418 6553 3582 2555 1544 4273 2277 
2014q2 1475 855 2417 1306 4231 2454 6898 3744 2685 1534 4479 2372 
2014q3 1523 857 2484 1338 4394 2514 7126 3857 2780 1538 4606 2436 
2014q4 1435 815 2341 1250 4158 2403 6750 3622 2765 1527 4552 2403 
2015q1 1549 908 2526 1340 4458 2671 7234 3857 2888 1636 4710 2494 
2015q2 1573 948 2556 1355 4524 2753 7335 3866 2896 1674 4686 2476 
2015q3 1598 984 2588 1369 4586 2839 7424 3918 2903 1745 4698 2482 
2015q4 1493 935 2412 1275 4271 2677 6899 3635 2818 1750 4535 2401 
 
 
57 
 
Forecast 
quarter 
Base 
Scenario  
Positive 
Variant 
Scenario  
Negative 
Variant 
Scenario  
Mixed 
Scenario  
Base 
Scenario  
Positive 
Variant 
Scenario  
Negative 
Variant 
Scenario  
Mixed 
Scenario  
Base 
Scenario  
Positive 
Variant 
Scenario  
Negative 
Variant 
Scenario  
Mixed 
Scenario  
REGION: NT REGION: EM REGION: WM 
2010q1 3070 3070 3070 3070 1300 1300 1300 1300 1355 1355 1355 1355 
2010q2 2930 2930 2930 2930 1280 1280 1280 1280 1515 1515 1515 1515 
2010q3 3535 3535 3535 3535 1370 1370 1370 1370 1585 1585 1585 1585 
2010q4 3573 3573 3573 3573 1201 1201 1201 1201 1620 1620 1620 1620 
2011q1 3725 3725 3725 3725 1242 1242 1242 1242 1727 1727 1727 1727 
2011q2 3692 3689 3658 3692 1194 1187 1244 1199 1755 1751 1775 1758 
2011q3 3641 3604 3665 3672 1164 1146 1247 1178 1796 1775 1889 1819 
2011q4 3323 3252 3484 3398 1106 1079 1232 1132 1773 1735 1966 1823 
2012q1 3330 3228 3706 3476 1166 1102 1369 1211 1845 1771 2190 1932 
2012q2 3337 3141 3965 3537 1198 1104 1500 1264 1882 1756 2418 2009 
2012q3 3344 3045 4248 3601 1238 1107 1660 1326 1920 1731 2619 2075 
2012q4 3160 2777 4291 3458 1210 1041 1728 1312 1885 1634 2708 2055 
2013q1 3237 2758 4683 3585 1343 1070 2017 1474 1969 1620 2951 2158 
2013q2 3342 2709 5096 3732 1403 1053 2212 1556 2040 1578 3157 2242 
2013q3 3485 2656 5578 3924 1476 1033 2365 1651 2138 1537 3377 2360 
2013q4 3464 2449 5712 3934 1466 951 2395 1655 2179 1441 3465 2417 
2014q1 3849 2455 6442 4403 1588 1002 2635 1807 2397 1465 3806 2678 
2014q2 4153 2461 7008 4788 1688 1005 2807 1937 2522 1481 3990 2837 
2014q3 4433 2500 7489 5149 1772 1015 2937 2050 2621 1519 4116 2970 
2014q4 4404 2428 7446 5162 1732 975 2855 2019 2586 1523 4063 2951 
2015q1 4717 2610 7976 5566 1869 1064 3054 2186 2705 1653 4258 3105 
2015q2 4945 2809 8295 5847 1893 1101 3062 2218 2763 1738 4328 3176 
2015q3 5132 2986 8550 6077 1923 1152 3101 2258 2810 1797 4400 3238 
2015q4 4979 2966 8233 5891 1826 1127 2935 2143 2736 1767 4279 3153 
 
 
 
58 
 
Forecast 
quarter 
Base 
Scenario  
Positive 
Variant 
Scenario  
Negative 
Variant 
Scenario  
Mixed 
Scenario  
Base 
Scenario  
Positive 
Variant 
Scenario  
Negative 
Variant 
Scenario  
Mixed 
Scenario  
Base 
Scenario  
Positive 
Variant 
Scenario  
Negative 
Variant 
Scenario  
Mixed 
Scenario  
REGION: YH REGION: WW TOTAL: England 
2010q1 1635 1635 1635 1635 915 915 915 915 12950 12950 12950 12950 
2010q2 1465 1465 1465 1465 915 915 915 915 12645 12645 12645 12645 
2010q3 1880 1880 1880 1880 1050 1050 1050 1050 14325 14325 14325 14325 
2010q4 1554 1554 1554 1554 1051 1051 1051 1051 13713 13713 13713 13713 
2011q1 1630 1630 1630 1630 1087 1087 1087 1087 14439 14439 14439 14439 
2011q2 1645 1632 1655 1647 1063 1060 1070 1064 14450 14383 14695 14427 
2011q3 1648 1635 1699 1650 1043 1028 1084 1052 14478 14308 15138 14502 
2011q4 1542 1520 1666 1567 975 950 1063 995 13666 13380 14967 13751 
2012q1 1650 1601 1897 1704 1020 976 1184 1056 14230 13645 16583 14401 
2012q2 1721 1628 2133 1810 1055 978 1320 1111 14410 13433 18037 14651 
2012q3 1802 1647 2421 1925 1106 991 1498 1183 14653 13208 19629 14950 
2012q4 1738 1525 2531 1882 1097 942 1605 1185 14044 12171 20037 14384 
2013q1 1896 1581 2975 2076 1194 973 1878 1312 15085 12313 22737 15441 
2013q2 2024 1574 3391 2237 1288 975 2156 1433 15738 12067 24874 16117 
2013q3 2175 1556 3778 2422 1397 977 2427 1571 16577 11808 26895 16987 
2013q4 2167 1409 3818 2427 1434 910 2531 1627 16547 10842 27287 16977 
2014q1 2453 1444 4322 2770 1618 932 2862 1853 18266 11180 30343 18777 
2014q2 2673 1463 4664 3042 1762 948 3095 2035 19427 11252 32262 20027 
2014q3 2870 1497 4923 3291 1890 975 3274 2199 20393 11440 33681 21091 
2014q4 2799 1427 4700 3232 1879 955 3200 2204 19880 11098 32707 20641 
2015q1 3062 1570 5025 3557 2041 1052 3411 2404 21248 12112 34783 22105 
2015q2 3153 1688 5093 3683 2112 1144 3456 2487 21747 12711 35355 22622 
2015q3 3189 1806 5068 3732 2158 1231 3465 2539 22141 13310 35828 23074 
2015q4 2937 1767 4639 3437 2050 1234 3259 2404 21062 12990 33931 21934 
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Data Appendix   
 
Interpolation of bi-annual data for aggregate arrears, repossessions and the mortgage 
stock 
 
CML publishes quarterly data for arrears, possessions and the outstanding mortgage stock, 
beginning in 2008. Half-yearly data for earlier years can be interpolated into quarterly data 
from the early 1980s, and linked to unpublished quarterly data from CML from 1999Q1. The 
interpolation for arrears, which are stock data, is straightforward, as a smoothed step-function. 
The H1 value is given to Q1 and Q2 and the H2 value to Q3 and Q4. Then logs are taken and 
a two-quarter moving average is taken of the log values. For the flow of possessions, the 
interpolation is a bit more complex. The quarterly data are created and scaled using H1 and 
H2 biannual data (scaling ensures that the total of the implied quarterly flows into possession 
add up to the published biannual data).28 
 
Definitions of regions 
 
The switch from Standard Statistical Regions (SSRs) to Government Office Regions (GORs) 
in the early 1990s has necessitated some aggregation of regions in the North and the South to 
obtain consistent historical series.  A ‘greater North’ region (NT) can be defined by adding 
SSR categories North West and North and is equivalent to the sum of GOR categories North 
West (including Merseyside) and North East.  A ‘greater South’ region (ST) consists of SSR 
categories East Anglia plus the rest of the South East (excluding Greater London) and is 
equivalent to GOR categories East plus the rest of the South East (excluding Greater London).  
The other regions: Yorkshire and Humberside (YH), East Midlands (EM), West Midlands 
(WM), Greater London (GL), South West (SW) and Wales (WW) are unchanged.  This gives 
eight regions in England and Wales. 
 
Court action (claims) and court order on data on repossessions 
 
Quarterly data for 1987 to the present on court orders and claims (actions) for mortgage 
possessions in English regions and Wales are available from the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), 
previously the Lord Chancellor's Department.29 The distribution of the claims and orders 
between the GORs are based on where the location of the court the claim or order was dealt 
with as opposed to where the property in question was located.30 There is some small 
discontinuity between the orders data for the two sub-periods before and after 1999. The order 
counts prior to 1999 represent the number of orders made, while those from 1999 onwards the 
number of claims leading to an order being made. Further, the pre-1999 data were sourced 
from manual returns which have a lower degree of accuracy than the later data sourced from 
the main county court administration systems.  
                                                 
28
 Q1
 t = H2t-1/6+ H1t/3, scaled by H1t /(Q1t +Q2 t); Q2 t = H1t/3+H2t/6, scaled by H1t /(Q1t +Q2 t); Q3 t 
= H1t/6+ H2t/3, scaled by H2t /(Q3t +Q4 t); and Q4 t = H2t/3+ H1t+1/6, scaled by H2t /(Q3t +Q4 t) . 
29
 We are grateful to Aidan Mews and Michael Howe of the MoJ for making the historical data 
available. 
30
 Comparisons by Aidan Mews (MoJ) indicate that the percentage changes over time in regions based 
on the location of the court are very similar to those based on the location of the property. 
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 The court actions (claims) and court order data need to be scaled relative to the number 
of mortgages outstanding per region, nmI. We define, pactions, the percentage of mortgages in 
the ith region in year t subject to Court actions as (actit/nmit-1) x 100, where claimit is the number 
of claims in region i, year t, and analogously for Court orders, porders. In logs, these variables 
are denoted log pclaims and log porders, respectively. 
 
Estimating the number of mortgages outstanding per region 
 
Before 1992, we use annual regional estimates of the number of mortgages outstanding by 
Anthony Murphy.  These were based on survey estimates of the number of mortgages relative to 
the number of owner occupiers in each region, scaled up by DCLG counts of the number of 
owner-occupiers in each region. From Labour Force Survey (LFS) Housing Trailers for 1971, 
1981, 1984, 1988 and 1991-93, he obtained estimates of the fraction of owner-occupiers with 
mortgages, omi for region i, at the end of each year.11 Fairly accurate estimates of this fraction for 
the UK as a whole are obtained by dividing nmUK, the number of mortgages outstanding from 
CML, by ohsUK, the number of owner-occupied houses (DCLG Housing Statistics, where all 
figures are at year-end. Let romi be the ratio omi/omUK. By fitting a cubic function/spline in time 
to romi it is possible to generate interpolated estimates for 1985 to 1995, fromi. We then define 
the estimated nmI, the number of mortgages in region i by,  
      
  nmi =(nmUK) (fromi) ohsi/ ohsUK 
   
Thus, the share of the number of UK mortgages in the ith region equals the share of owner-
occupied houses scaled by fromi. 
 From 1992, the new Survey of Mortgage Lenders included banks as well as building 
societies and provides a basis for a different estimation method.  This cumulates the number of 
new advances in each region and assumes that the number of mortgages paid off each quarter is 
1.5 percent of the number of outstanding mortgages.  This corresponds to about 6 percent of 
mortgages being paid off each year.  The regional estimates of number of mortgages which result 
are scaled by the CML count for the UK divided by the UK sum of the regional estimates.  
 Among the explanatory variables, several rely on estimates of ami, the average mortgage 
outstanding in region i. Since there are no reliable survey measures, the average mortgage 
outstanding is estimated as follows:  An initial estimate of the mortgage stock in each region is 
obtained from the sum with geometrically declining weights of the value of mortgages for home 
purchase31 issued in the previous ten years for each region. Before 1991, the data come from the 
Five Percent Building Society Sample and may understate the size of the average mortgage 
particularly in London and the South. For these two regions the data are therefore scaled up by 10 
percent before 1991 and by 5 percent thereafter to reflect the plausibly higher remortgage rates in 
London and the South. The decay factor chosen is 0.015 per quarter as for the estimate of the 
count of mortgages described above.  The sum across regions accounts for roughly 75 percent of 
the total UK mortgage stock from Financial Statistics published by the ONS, taking the average 
of figures from 1987 to 2009.  The share of region i in the sum over regions in the initial 
estimates of the mortgage stock is then multiplied by the total UK mortgage stock from the ONS 
to give an estimate of the mortgage stock in each region.  Dividing by the estimated number of 
                                                 
31
 This is as opposed to refinancing an existing mortgage. 
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mortgages in each region constructed by a similar method32, gives the average outstanding 
mortgage in each region.  Note that systematic biases in the method of construction common to 
the estimates of numbers and of totals of mortgages outstanding will tend to cancel out.  The 
ONS figure for the outstanding mortgage stock includes the cumulative effect of refinancing and 
additional advances beyond the initial mortgage.  To the extent that these could be 
proportionately larger in some regions than others beyond the adjustments made for London and 
the South, our estimates for the average mortgage in region i could suffer from an approximation 
error.  However, it is likely that alternative estimates, for example by imputing average mortgage 
sizes for each region from the Family Expenditure Survey data on mortgage payments, would be 
less accurate still.  The response rate for the FES and its successor survey has never been 
significantly above 70 percent and has been closer to 60 percent in recent years.  The response 
rate is believed to be substantially lower for younger, more affluent and more mobile households 
and sampling variability also makes data from this source too unreliable for our purposes. 
 
Regional house price indices 
 
Regional mix-adjusted house price indices for all dwellings were constructed in quarterly form 
from 1968 to 2004. Regions were weighted based on the owner-occupied housing stock per 
region, in order to convert from a Government Office Region basis to eight regions, including 
Wales, as described above. These data were linked to the recent data from DCLG reported on a 
Government Office Region basis. Again the series were weighted appropriately using 2004 
weights, to combine regions forming a ‘greater North’ region (NT) and a ‘greater South’ region 
(ST). The two sets of data were spliced in 2000Q4. 
         
The debt to equity ratio 
 
We estimate average debt/equity ratios for each region by scaling the average mortgage amit-1 by 
hpit, an estimate of the average house price. This multiplies the mix-adjusted house price index 
for the region by the average dwelling price in a base year, taken to be 2000.  
 
Negative equity and the debt to equity ratio 
 
We estimate average debt/equity ratios for each region by scaling the average mortgage amit-1 
by hpit, an estimate of the average house price. This multiplies the mix-adjusted house price 
index for the region by the average dwelling price in a base year, taken to be 2000. We 
assume a relationship, based on the logistic distribution, between the proportion of mortgages 
in negative equity and the debt to equity ratio as follows: 
  
   = (1/(1 + exp (−λ(	 *+, - + .)  
 
We assume λ=7, which is meant to be of the order of magnitude of the inverse of the standard 
deviation of the distribution of log debt/equity across households.  The F-function is linear in 
time and is calibrated to match estimates of the incidence of negative equity by region at two 
points in time.  These are estimates by the CML for 2009q1, see Tatch (2009), and estimates 
for 1992q1 by Gentle et al. (1994).  The latter are defined relative to numbers of recent 
                                                 
32
 Note that this is different from the method described above which links to pre-1992 estimates by 
Anthony Murphy. 
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mortgages rather than of numbers of outstanding mortgages and the regional breakdown did 
not correspond exactly and hence required some adjustment. 
 
 
The tax-adjusted mortgage rate 
 
The tax-adjusted mortgage interest rate, arbm, is defined as (1-sittrt) , where trt is the standard rate 
at which tax relief applies and sit is an estimate of the fraction of mortgages under the tax relief 
ceiling. sit varies from region to region. A simple estimate defines sit = 1 if the median mortgage 
is under the tax relief ceiling of £30,000 and sit = 30,000/amit-1 otherwise. This is correct for the 
median mortgage but rather approximate for the average of tax adjustments as it neglects the 
inequality of the distribution of mortgages which would, for example, ensure that some 
mortgages were over the ceiling even with a median mortgage of £25,000 say. 
  
The debt service ratio 
 
The debt-service ratio is computed as the product of the tax-adjusted mortgage interest rate 
(arbmit) and the average mortgage (amit-1) divided by an estimate of full time earnings per head 
(yit). Note that this definition of the debt-service ratio omits the repayment element in regular 
mortgage payments. Thus,  
 
  dsrir  = (arbmit) (amit-1)/yit 
 
Regional earnings measures 
 
Annual average full time earnings by region come from the New Earnings Survey linked in 1998 
to ASHE data and are April figures. These data were spliced to annual 2004-2009 figures from 
Regional Trends as follows. Male and female mean gross weekly earnings by region (Table 9.21, 
Regional Trends) are available for 2004-2006 and for 2006-2009, but there are two 
discontinuities introduced by changes to the ASHE methodology. In 2004 supplementary 
information was included to improve coverage and in 2006 changes to the sample design were 
made to improve the quality of the estimates. These regional earnings data were weighted by the 
regional shares of full-time employment of males and females relative to full-time UK 
employment (Table 9.5, Regional Trends) to obtain the series for all workers.  As the regional 
employment numbers for males and females include part-time workers, a correction had to be 
made for part-time hours worked by males and females relative to total part-time hours worked 
(Table 9.1, Regional Trends). These resulting series were spliced in 2006, and again to the earlier 
data in 2004. Then the regions were combined to form a ‘greater North’ region (NT) and a 
‘greater South’ region (ST), weighting by full-time employment by region. Finally the annual 
data were interpolated to a quarterly frequency, using a quarterly step function from the annual 
data and taking a four-quarter moving average.  This is centered so that the second quarter 
figure matches the NES/ASHE data for April in each year. The earnings data are not tax 
adjusted, though regional fixed effects should capture most of the differences in tax rates by 
region. 
 
Regional unemployment measures 
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Regional unemployment rates correspond to the Labour Force Survey definition and come from 
ONS Labour Market Statistics Tables 18A and B from 1992 Q2.  Before this date, regional 
unemployment rates from the ONS Claimant Count and Vacancies, Tables EGU3 and EGU4 
are adjusted to the LFS basis using a regression method. The UK unemployment rate on the 
LFS basis is available quarterly back to the 1970s.  For each region, a linear regression of the 
regional LFS unemployment rate on the claimant count unemployment rate and the difference 
between the UK LFS and claimant count unemployment rates is run on data for 1992Q2 to 
2010Q1.  The fitted values before 1992Q2 are then taken as estimates for each region of the 
LFS unemployment rates. 
 
Use of dummies to proxy policy shifts and lending standards 
 
This paper uses estimated latent variables based on dummies, to capture changes in loan 
quality and policy forbearance. The forbearance policy function estimated in Aron and 
Muellbauer (2010) is a simple function of dummy variables.  The first is a step dummy equal 
to one from 1992Q1 and zero before.  This reflects the December 1991 policy response to the 
mounting possessions crisis with an agreement between mortgage lenders and the 
government, see discussion In Section 2.2.  After 1995, it seems likely that a gradual return 
began toward more standard behaviour since, in that year, the government substantially 
reduced the generosity of SMI, despite lender criticism. A smoothed step dummy, see below, 
for 1997 captures this return to normal, imposing the restriction that the 1991 shift is eventually 
cancelled out. In 2008Q4, forbearance policy shifted again, with government pressure on lenders 
to exercise generosity, see Section 2.2 for further discussion. The industry’s mortgage code of 
practice was also tightened through the Mortgage Pre-action Protocol.  The latter shift would 
have introduced delay on possessions procedures, and implies a partial reversal after a few 
quarters of the initial impact of the policy shift.  A step dummy beginning in 2008Q4 and a three 
quarter lag of this dummy capture these possibilities.   
Lending standards evolve more slowly than policy and have gradual effects on 
mortgage defaults; heterogeneity of individual borrowers and of lender behaviour results in 
smoothness in aggregate default rates in responding to shocks.  A smoothed step dummy 
defined from a double moving average of step dummies is a good potential proxy for loan 
quality. For example define a step dummy sd89 which is zero up to 1988Q4 and one from 
1989Q1.  The four-quarter moving average of this, termed sd89ma, takes the value 0.25 in 
1989Q1, 0.5 in 1989Q2, 0.75 in 1989Q3 and 1 in 1989Q4.  Now take a five-quarter moving 
average of sd89ma, termed sd89mm.  This rises in an ‘S-shape’ from zero in 1988Q4 to reach 
one in 1990Q4. Linear combinations of such double moving averages of step dummies 
provide a simple way of representing smooth transitions.  
Figure 9 plots the estimated values of LQ and PS, which are defined as follows: 
 
The loan quality equation 
t t t
t t
t t 2 t 2
4
86 86 89 89 94 94
95 95 97 97 05 05
06 06 07 07 09 d2008q4
09 d2008q4 10 10 12 12
t
t t t
LQ l sdmm l sdmm l sdmm
l sdmm l sdmm l sdmm
l sdmm l a sdmm l a s
l b s l sdmm l sdmm
− −
−
= × + × + ×
+ × + × + ×
+ × + × + ×
+ × + × + ×
       
 
The forbearance policy equation   
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3 4
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09 2008 4 09 2008 4
t t tt
t t
PS p sd sdmm p sd q
p a sd q p b sd q
−
− −
= × − + ×
+ × + ×
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ANNEX:  Forecast scenarios: underlying assumptions 2010q4-2015q4 
 Quarterly rates increment Quarterly growth rates increments 
 Unemployment rate Mortgage Rate Earnings  House Prices Mortgage Lending 
Stock  
 negative 
variant 
positive 
variant 
negative 
variant 
positive 
variant 
positive 
variant 
negative 
variant 
positive 
variant 
negative 
variant 
positive 
variant 
negative 
variant 
Dec-10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mar-11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jun-11 0.2 0 0.002 0 0.005 -0.005 0.0075 -0.0075 0.002 -0.002 
Sep-11 0.4 -0.1 0.004 0 0.005 -0.005 0.0075 -0.0075 0.002 -0.002 
Dec-11 0.6 -0.2 0.006 0 0.005 -0.005 0.0075 -0.0075 0.002 -0.002 
Mar-12 0.8 -0.3 0.008 -0.001 0.005 -0.005 0.0075 -0.0075 0.002 -0.002 
Jun-12 0.9 -0.4 0.01 -0.002 0.005 -0.005 0.0075 -0.0075 0.002 -0.002 
Sep-12 1 -0.5 0.012 -0.003 0.005 -0.005 0.0075 -0.0075 0.002 -0.002 
Dec-12 1 -0.5 0.014 -0.0041 0.005 -0.005 0.0075 -0.0075 0.002 -0.002 
Mar-13 1 -0.5 0.016 -0.0076 0.005 -0.005 0.0075 -0.0075 0.002 -0.002 
Jun-13 1 -0.5 0.018 -0.0111 0.005 -0.005 0.0075 -0.0075 0.002 -0.002 
Sep-13 1 -0.5 0.018 -0.0147 0.005 -0.005 0.0075 -0.0075 0.002 -0.002 
Dec-13 1 -0.5 0.018 -0.0182 0.005 -0.005 0.0075 -0.0075 0.002 -0.002 
Mar-14 1 -0.5 0.018 -0.0172 0.005 -0.005 0.0075 -0.0075 0.002 -0.002 
Jun-14 1 -0.5 0.018 -0.0164 0.005 -0.005 0.0075 -0.0075 0.002 -0.002 
Sep-14 1 -0.5 0.018 -0.0155 0.005 -0.005 0.0075 -0.0075 0.002 -0.002 
Dec-14 1 -0.5 0.018 -0.0146 0.005 -0.005 0.0075 -0.0075 0.002 -0.002 
Mar-15 1 -0.5 0.018 -0.0135 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 
Jun-15 1 -0.5 0.018 -0.0135 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 
Sep-15 1 -0.5 0.018 -0.0135 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 
Dec-15 1 -0.5 0.018 -0.0135 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 
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NT REGION: BASE SCENARIO ASSUMPTIONS 
 Unemployment Rate, ur 
(%) 
House Price, hp 
(£) 
Earnings, y 
(£, weekly mean) 
Mortgage Rate, arbm  
(/100) 
No. of Mortgages, Nm 
(number) 
Mortage Lending Stock, 
amwt     (£mn) 
Dec-10 9.05 164277 563.20 0.0365 1665817 134323 
Mar-11 9.13 163360 568.45 0.0365 1668632 134625 
Jun-11 9.21 162443 573.70 0.0365 1671574 134923 
Sep-11 9.29 161525 578.95 0.0367 1674647 135172 
Dec-11 9.22 161548 584.82 0.0378 1677859 135441 
Mar-12 9.14 161570 590.70 0.0388 1681215 135802 
Jun-12 9.06 161592 596.57 0.0398 1684722 136370 
Sep-12 8.98 161614 602.45 0.0408 1688387 137223 
Dec-12 8.80 163288 608.56 0.0419 1692199 138338 
Mar-13 8.62 164962 614.67 0.0454 1696189 139594 
Jun-13 8.43 166635 620.79 0.0489 1700259 140947 
Sep-13 8.25 168309 626.90 0.0525 1704388 142418 
Dec-13 8.20 170243 633.28 0.056 1708561 143959 
Mar-14 8.15 172178 639.66 0.057 1712765 145662 
Jun-14 8.10 174112 646.04 0.0582 1717000 147561 
Sep-14 8.05 176046 652.42 0.0593 1721267 149668 
Dec-14 8.00 177863 659.05 0.0604 1725566 151988 
Mar-15 7.95 179680 665.68 0.0613 1729895 154555 
Jun-15 7.89 181497 672.31 0.0613 1734258 157259 
Sep-15 7.84 183314 678.93 0.0613 1738652 160026 
Dec-15 7.71 185152 685.83 0.0613 1743079 162851 
Notes: 
1.  The assumptions of other scenarios and other regions are available on request. 
2. The assumptions are based on Oxford Economics forecasts. We are grateful to Adrian Cooper of Oxford Economics for making these available. 
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ST REGION: BASE SCENARIO ASSUMPTIONS 
 Unemployment Rate, ur 
(%) 
House Price, hp 
(£) 
Earnings, y 
(£, weekly mean) 
Mortgage Rate, arbm  
(/100) 
No. of Mortgages, Nm 
(number) 
Mortgage Lending Stock, 
amwt     (£mn) 
Dec-10 6.50 252551 670.27 0.0365 2941614 380072 
Mar-11 6.57 251387 676.43 0.0365 2946585 380926 
Jun-11 6.64 250224 682.59 0.0365 2951779 381769 
Sep-11 6.71 249061 688.76 0.0367 2957205 382475 
Dec-11 6.65 249814 695.96 0.0378 2962877 383238 
Mar-12 6.60 250567 703.17 0.0388 2968803 384257 
Jun-12 6.54 251321 710.38 0.0398 2974998 385865 
Sep-12 6.48 252074 717.58 0.0408 2981469 388277 
Dec-12 6.31 255076 725.27 0.0419 2988201 391434 
Mar-13 6.14 258077 732.95 0.0454 2995246 394987 
Jun-13 5.97 261079 740.63 0.0489 3002433 398814 
Sep-13 5.80 264080 748.31 0.0525 3009725 402978 
Dec-13 5.73 268074 756.35 0.056 3017094 407339 
Mar-14 5.65 272067 764.38 0.057 3024517 412158 
Jun-14 5.57 276060 772.42 0.0582 3031996 417531 
Sep-14 5.50 280054 780.45 0.0593 3039531 423493 
Dec-14 5.42 284071 788.76 0.0604 3047122 430058 
Mar-15 5.34 288089 797.08 0.0613 3054766 437321 
Jun-15 5.27 292107 805.39 0.0613 3062471 444971 
Sep-15 5.19 296125 813.70 0.0613 3070231 452802 
Dec-15 5.05 300137 822.25 0.0613 3078047 460795 
Notes: 
1.  The assumptions of other scenarios and other regions are available on request. 
2. The assumptions are based on Oxford Economics forecasts. We are grateful to Adrian Cooper of Oxford Economics for making these available. 
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